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How does the discovery of the mausoleum of Herod the Great in the West Bank relate 
to Jewish Neo-Zionist territorial claims? What are the connections between 
agricultural farms and social exclusion? And why is it so difficult for Kaadan, an 
Arab citizen of Israel, to purchase state owned land outside his own town? 
In Israel, development schemes often contain a nationalistic overtone, marked by 
ethnic delineation and religious sentiments. This thesis, a cross-disciplinary socio-
cultural and historical-geographical study, examines the role that religion, ethnicity 
and nationality play in the creation of ethnoscapes and ethno-classes. It is argued 
that the exclusive religious character of Israeli nationality poses a challenge to 
distributive justice and social sustainability. Focusing on the case of the Arab-
Bedouins in the Negev, the relationship between nationality, demographic design and 
spatial domination is studied, revealing the interconnectedness of the politics of 
space, place, myth and identity. 
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On January 13th 2007 a Jewish farmer shot to death an Arab-Bedouin who trespassed 
his property (Barshovski 2007:340). Looking at this incident from the perspective of 
the Jewish farmer, the trespassing occurred when the 25 years old Arab-Bedouin man 
crossed the border of his farm. From the Arab-Bedouins perspective, the trespassing 
took place when this border was first drawn. The focus of this thesis is on the issues 
of territorial and social boundaries. The objective is twofold: (a) to scrutinize the 
relationship between the Israeli state and its ethnic Arab-Bedouin minority, focusing 
on the ways spatial control and other means of domination are being legitimized by 
the hegemonic order; and (b) studying the impact that Israeli development policies 
have on the social equity of its Arab-Bedouin citizens. 
Israel belongs to the category of settler nations similar to countries such as North 
America, French Algeria, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand.  Settler states are 
states where the hegemonic group has immigrated from abroad and rules over an 
indigenous population. Modern literature on encounters between white settlers and 
indigenous people is extensive (Hamdan 2005b; Hasson 1998; Howitt 2001; 
Kellerman 1996; Kimmerling 1999; Meir and Zivan 1998; Schnell 2004; Yiftachel 
1998), to mention a few notable publications. Settlers encounters with the local 
people can take various forms, ranging from limited partnership to ethnocide and to 
genocide (Kellerman 1996). Often in history the power balance between the settlers 
and the indigenous population determined the nature of this encounter. In New 
Zealand, where the Maori were strong, there was some form of limited partnership 
(Howitt 2001). An ethnocide may occur where the state wishes to secure its 
national identity. For instance, in the nation building process of countries such as 
Canada, assimilation policies were used to civilize the native population, aiming to 
eliminate cultural differences and indigenous territorial claims. On the other hand, in 
Tasmania and in the Caribbeans a relatively weaker native community was subjected 
to genocide. During the first half of the nineteenth century the encounters that took 
place between white European fur hunters and the North American Great Plains 
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Indians were relatively peaceful, as both cultures borrowed and adopted cultural 
elements from each other. However, when the power relations changed as more white 
settlers arrived, the encounter gradually turned more violent (Meir and Zivan 
1998:244). The encounter between the Jewish settlers and the Arab-Bedouins is 
somewhat similar to that of the encounter in America, in the sense of progressing 
from a peaceful encounter towards a more violent conflict. 
The discussion of development policies and Arab-Bedouins social equity is closely 
associated with issues of settlement, which are pregnant with notions of security and 
demography. It is argued that these issues, which have a daily effect on the lives of 
the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev, are strongly influenced by the construction of Israeli 
national identity. To appreciate the connections between unsustainable development 
policies and national identity, narratives related to identity, security, pioneering and 
settlement are examined. 
States have often used agricultural settlements in order to claim land and determine 
borders, for example, during the Ottoman period in Cyprus, during the nineteenth 
century agricultural colonies in Argentina, in the Canadian Prairies, and in the 
American frontier. Settlement activity can be regarded as a strategy of defining geo-
political boundaries between states, usually in an attempt to settle the minimum of 
people over a maximum of territory, (Hasson and Gossenfeld 1980), or as an activity 
designed to enlarge the territory of the state and form a cultural base for building the 
nation (Kimmerling 1999). The narratives relevant to settlement activity in Israel 
include: halutziut (pioneering), hafrachat hashmama (making the desert bloom), 
hityashvut (settlement), geulat karka (land redemption) and kibush hashmama 
(conquest of the desert). 
The Israeli political geographer Oren Yiftachel, who studied the socio-geographical 
consequences of the Israeli settler-politics, found that the encounter between settler 
societies and indigenous people creates two distinct developments. The first 
development is the rearrangement of society around ethno-classes, where the settler 
society forms the cultural, economic and political elite, while indigenous people 
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occupy lesser position in the socio-economic grid (Yiftachel 1998; 2003:24). The 
second development is the rise of ethnic opposition to the dominant outsider 
hegemonic power (Yiftachel 2003). For Yiftachel, territory is an essential element in 
the encounter between the state and the local people, being a mechanism which states 
use for gaining control over minority groups (Ibid:25). As a result of the rising 
resistance to the hegemonic power and its ethos, minorities often rediscover and even 
reinvent their communal identities, giving voice to counter narratives of their own. 
Before continuing, it will be useful to contextualize the encounter between the Jews 
and the Arabs in Israel/ Palestine. 
During four centuries of Turkish Ottoman rule, the Arab-Bedouin people in the 
Negev lived their lives according to their tribal traditions and nomadic life styles. 
Until 1948, the population of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev ranged between 65,000 
and 90,000 people. However, after the Naqba (disaster), i.e. the War of 
Independence in 1948, 80-85% of the Negev Arab-Bedouins moved or were forced to 
move outside Israeli borders (Boteach 2006; Falah 1989; Goering 1979). Today, less 
than 10% of the remaining Arab-Bedouin people in Israel are able to maintain their 
traditional pastoral way of life and are ranked lowest in the socio-economic strata. 
This was the  result of a number of factors: historically restricted access to economic, 
natural and social resources (Meir and Zivan 1998; Rosen-Zvi 2004), institutional 
discrimination (Adalah 2001), and a policy of spatial control (Falah 1985; Hamdan 
2005b; Yiftachel 2003). The aggregated impact of the factors mentioned above led to 
the fact that the Arab-Bedouins living today in the Negev are among the poorest in 
Israel, occupy only 1.3% of their traditional ancestral territories and are in the midst 
of a conflict over land ownership with the Israeli state (Shagri-Bdarma 2006). 
The encounter between the Jewish settlers and the Arab-Bedouins dates back to the 
beginning of the Jewish settlement in Palestine. The relationships between the Jews 
and the Arab-Bedouins began over 120 years ago, around the year 1880, when Jews 
from Poland began buying land and settling in Palestine (Aaronson 1983). The Jewish 
settlement activity expressed itself through two types of settlement: farmers frontier 
(the Moshava or colony) and labourers frontier (the Kibbutz and the Moshav 
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collective settlements) (Hasson 1998:121). The first phase of settlement (1880-
1917) took place during the pre-state years under the Ottoman regime. This phase was 
peaceful as the Jewish socialist ideology of the Kibbutz met with Arab-Bedouin 
traditional hospitability (Meir and Zivan 1998:249). Influenced by the British 
romantization of Laurence of Arabia and ideas of the noble savage, the first settlers 
debated among themselves the extent to which they should adopt the Arab-Bedouin 
culture. However, as the encounter entered the post-independence phase, it became 
more violent, and its nature shifted from being local and personal to national and 
militaristic (Meir and Zivan 1998:257). The invasion of Israel by five Arab states in 
1948 worsened the relations between Jews and the Arab-Bedouin community, 
especially in the Negev desert, where some Arab-Bedouins collaborated with the 
invading Egyptian armed forces (Peled 1992:434). 
The Jewish Settlement in Palestine was supported by salient national narratives, such 
as aliya lakarka (ascent to the Land of Israel), halutziyut, and national heroic 
myths, such as the event of Tel-Hai (discussed below). These narratives and myths 
spoke of the redemption of the Fatherland, as well as the spiritual redemption of those 
Jews who settled in Palestine. During this period the frontier became a major 
Zionist icon, demonstrated in an Israeli popular song: We shall build the land, our 
homeland which was written by A. Levinston: 
 We shall build our country, our homeland because it is ours, ours, this land 
 We shall build our country, our homeland; it is the command of our blood, the 
 command of generations 
 We shall build our country in the face of our adversaries; we shall build the 
 country with the power of our will 
 The end to shameful slavery the fire of freedom is burning, the glorious shine 
 of hope will stir our blood 
 Thirsty for freedom for independence we shall march without fear to liberate 
 our people 
(Quoted in Yiftachel 2000:738). 
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The image of the frontier was associated with the Zionist ethos of (re) building the 
nation through the return to the (home) land, cultivating the land, defending it and 
creating a new liberated society based on collective socialist ideals. The frontier 
symbolized a process of the national and spiritual revival of the Jews, a movement 
from the ghetto, the home of the money lender, to the frontier settlement, the home of 
the new muscular Jew, represented as a labourer and a warrior (Hasson 1998). The 
Zionists felt that the Jewish people had become detached from nature during their 
exile and hence they urged the European Jews to return to the historic homeland, 
the place of initia gentis (where the nation first arose) and to become closer to nature 
through agricultural labour (Gal 2007). The following song, written by Yoram Tehar-
Lev in 1980 demonstrates the idea of the new Zionist Jew who claimed the land 
through his intimate knowledge of its secrets and walking and settling it. 
 Arise and walk through the land with a backpack and a stick. Surely you will 
 find along the way the path of the good land.  
 The good land will embrace you; she will call you as if to a bed of love.  
 And groves of olive trees, the hidden spring still guard its dream, our ancient 
 dream. 
 And red roofs on a hill and children on the path in that place we walked with 
 a backpack and a stick 
(Quoted in Yiftachel 2002:230). 
The new Zionist Jew who redeemed the land through his physical strength was 
constructed in contrast to two others: the Diaspora Jews and the local Arabs 
(Ibid:228). 
1.1.1 From Money to Sword 
The Zionist transformation project was in effect a Westernization project as a form of 
self elevation. The Jewish settlers who immigrated to Israel from Europe imagined 
their new self based on the system of symbols, images and speeches that were used 
to mark them as inferior. The Jewish settlers who arrived from Europe carried with 
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them an inferiority complex: being marked not merely as being backward, but 
backward because being Oriental, Eastern, or Asian. Consequently, the new settlers in 
Palestine projected these stereotypic symbols to the general Arab population and to 
the Jews arriving from Arab countries1 (Khazoom 2003). The constitution of the 
settlers mythical image is important for understanding the characteristics of the 
encounter between the Jewish farmers and the Arab-Bedouins within the context of 
the states development initiatives in the Negev, (e.g. the Sharon Plan) and for 
understanding the way in which this image has been used to legitimize land 
acquisition in Israel. 
Development initiatives in Israel, such as the Sharon Plan (described below), often 
use rhetorics pregnant with national sentiments and resort to narratives expressing the 
national ethos. These rhetorics and narratives are linked to the Zionist ideology of 
building a home for the Jewish people in their assumed historical homeland- 
Zion/Palestine. For example, making the desert bloom is a narrative full of 
prominent connotations. The assumed ability of the Jews to develop the land 
resources to a higher level, as compared with the Arab-Bedouins ineptitude in the 
Negev, was used in the Zionist rhetoric to claim title over the land (George 1979:89). 
Levi Eshkol, who served as Israels third Prime Minister, was quoted in the Jerusalem 
Post, Feb. 1969 saying that: it was only after the Zionist made the desert bloom 
that they [the Arabs] became interested in taking it from us [the Jews] (Jerusalem 
Post 1969). 
The symbolic meaning folded into the encounter between Jews and Arab-Bedouins in 
the Negev is not only associated with a struggle over land resources between the local 
people and the developers, but also with an ideological conflict that concerns 
different national identities of the state and the Arab-Bedouins. On the one side there 
is the states attempt to sustain its national identity as Jewish, while on the other side 
                                            
1 Due to the scope of this thesis it will not cover a major issue intimately linked to the Zionist project- 
the disparities within the Jewish Israeli Society in Israel, specifically between Ashkenazim (European 
Jews) and Mizrahim (North African Jews). 
 7
is the Arab-Bedouin struggle to assert its right for social, political and cultural self 
determination (Hasson 1998). 
In contemporary Israel, the deep cleavages between the Jewish and the Arab-Bedouin 
communities are hardly a surprise, considering that Israel is a bi-national society with 
a Jewish majority constituting about 80% of the population and that most of its 
structural social basis is intact. Israel does not have a constitution, there is no 
separation between the state and the church, and there are some eighteen official laws 
discriminating Arabs (Svirski and Chason 2005). The disparities between the Jews 
and the Arabs are especially noticeable in the case of the Sharon Plan, a national 
development scheme initiated to address the Bedouin problem in the Negev. Within 
the context of the Sharon Plan, development is associated with the promotion of two 
main goals: (a) increasing the numbers of Jewish population in the Negev and (b) 
solving the Arab-Bedouins illegal acquisition of land by dislocating them into 
seven state-built semi-urban localities. These goals appear to be linked to the Zionist 
modernization and Westernization project in Israel, where control over the land is 
validated by developing it (George 1979). However, while studying the impact of 
the Sharon Plan on the social equity of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev, the claim 
that this development scheme is promoted in order to modernize them is contested in 
this thesis. Instead, it is suggested that the construction of national identity and the 
concept of citizenship play a more significant role in explaining the states policy of 
relocating the Arab-Bedouins. Accordingly, the Sharon Plan serves as a departure 
point for analyzing the challenges that unsustainable development poses to the social 
equity of the Arab-Bedouin community in the Negev. 
The conflict in the Negev may be interpreted as a conflict over natural resources. 
However, what one sees depends upon one's subjective experience and position in 
relation to the issues surrounding this case. From the perspective of the Arab-
Bedouins, the conflict is over the right to culture and the right to full participation 
in the social and economical everyday life. On the other hand, the state perceives the 
case as an issue of protecting (Jewish) national land. These two realities coexist and 
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they depend on ones perception, the way light is either a particle or a wave. Before 
continuing, it would be useful to clarify the concept of social equity. 
1.2 Development and Social Exclusion 
Social equity means equal consideration of economic, environmental and social needs 
and includes the rights for food and shelter, safe drinking water, cultural and religious 
freedoms, political participation and access to health and education services. 
Accordingly, social equity requires intra-generational integrity, meaning equal 
distribution of environmental, economic and social resources (Howitt 2001; Parawer 
and Sarphus 2006:9). The concept of social equity emphasises the need to expand the 
circle of opportunities available to weak communities in an attempt to reverse the 
harming effects of social exclusion (MCSD 2000). Another distinguishing feature of 
social equity is the formulation of a communitys vision of the good life (Gabbay 
2005). The concept of social equity is meant not only as a principle of inter-
generational responsibility but also as an intra-generational integrity, implicating 
transparency, inclusiveness and equality in the distribution of natural resources 
among present communities (Gabbay 2005:13). 
The concept of social equity is intimately linked to the paradigm of sustainable 
development (SD). The term sustainable comes from the Latin word sustenere, 
literally meaning to uphold. In its modern version, the term sustainable was first 
used in the German forest management (Ruud 2006:136). The United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization defines sustainable development as having 
three dimensions, which include environmental reliability, economic vitality and 
social equity (UNIDO 2006). Consequently, successful SD consists of the parallel 
consideration of all three factors. 
Ever since sustainable development emerged as a development concept, non- 
governmental as well as governmental organizations have embraced it as the new 
development paradigm. Since the Brundtland Report (1987) and Agenda 21 (1992) 
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were published, there has been a growing awareness in the world for environmental 
problems and their possible solutions. It has also became clear that it is impossible to 
separate environmental issues from economical and social factors (ILA 2005). 
Sustainable development means different things to different people, but the most 
frequently quoted definition is taken from the World Commission on Environment 
and Development, also known as the Brundtland Commission: Sustainable 
development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Brundtland 
1987:43). This quotation, which has been extensively used by academics, 
governments and NGOs for defining SD, emphasises the moral obligation that 
contemporary communities have towards future generations vis a vis the environment. 
This is to say that the sustainability of the environment is dependant on inter-
generational equity, i.e. no natural resources should be consumed beyond their natural 
rate of recovery. 
The debate about sustainable development often involves a discussion of peoples 
access to natural resources. This means that the interpretation of sustainability is 
relevant both to the relations between humans and the environment, as well as to the 
interrelations within human societies (Woodhouse 2000:162). Indeed, the Brundtland 
Report defines SD not only in environmental terms, but also as a social concept, 
specifically related to poverty reduction (Brundtland 1987:14). In the same vein, the 
General Assembly decided that poverty reduction is of primary concern to the 
implementation of Agenda 21. This decision was also reflected in the Copenhagen 
Declaration on Social Development, and in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 
(UNDSD 2007). In conclusion: the issue of poverty reduction is a prime 
consideration for the SD paradigm. 
The Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals address the 
various levels of human development, including halving by 2015 the number of 
people living under extreme poverty in the world (UNDP 2007). As with any 
formulation, defining poverty operationally is a complicated task. The World Bank is 
holding people whose income is less than 1 US dollars per day to be extremely poor 
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(Alan 2000:11). However, extreme poverty is not the only form of poverty. The 
United Nations Economic and Social Commissions for Asia and the Pacific considers 
the most important aspects of poverty to be (a) health (b) education and (c) standard 
of living. Poverty is () measured in terms of basic education, health care, nutrition, 
water, and sanitation, as well as income () (UNESC 2007). Indeed, Poverty is not 
a certain small amount of goods, nor is it just a relation between means and ends: 
above all it is a relation between people (Alan 2000:20). According to this, poverty 
is not just having a low income; it is also a social status. Deepa Narayan finds poverty 
to be the lack of material well-being, insecurity, social isolation, psychological 
distress, and lack of freedom of choice and action (Narayan 2000:18). With relation 
to the above, poverty implies need, limited resources, low standard of living, lack of 
basic security and dependency (Banik 2006b:11). 
Amartya Sen defines poverty as the failure to participate in human society and as a 
lack of choice, rather than just a matter of insufficient material living standards (Sen 
1984). According to Sens Capability Approach, an authentic development ethic 
shouldnt be divorced from the hopes, expectations and aspirations of ordinary 
people (Clark 2000:9). This means that development is understood as the enrichment 
of human lives in the sense of having the freedom to choose between different ways 
of living (Hewitt 2000:308). The failure to participate in human society takes 
different forms in different societies and is conceptualized by the term social 
exclusion. 
The European Foundation defines social exclusion as the process through which 
individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the 
society in which they live (European Foundation, Quoted in Alan 2000:14). The 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
regards social exclusion as: 
 Any discrimination, exclusion, restriction, or preference based on race, colour, 
 descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 
 nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal 
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 footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
 social, cultural or any other field of public life (NCF 2006a:8). 
For example, social exclusion may occur when changes in land tenure are made, 
causing people to loose their homes and forcing them to resettle on less fertile land, 
with insufficient access to resources such as social infrastructures or even drinking 
water. Social exclusion is thus a concept that relates to the mechanisms and 
institutions that marginalize people. 
Different societies have different means for excluding the other and for preventing 
him or her from having access to social, cultural and natural resources. Deprivation 
and social exclusion have appeared in many shape and forms, whether as the Jati 
Caste systems in India, former Apartheid in South Africa or slavery system in the US, 
or marginalization of Aboriginal people in Australia. History is crowded with 
examples of social exclusion; whether it is the lack of womens voting rights in 
Bhutan, the expulsion of all Asians from Uganda under Idi Amin, or the official race 
categorization against ethnic Chinese and Indians under the Malay Supremacy 
policy in Malaysia. While social exclusion in Israel takes many forms, the discussion 
in this thesis is limited to the exclusion of the Arab-Bedouin community in the Negev, 
associated with the various mechanisms of spatial and symbolic domination. 
1.2.1 Social Exclusion and the Geography of Poverty 
Land has always been an important resource in the lives of the Arab-Bedouins, 
especially since their social structure and internal hierarchy is set according to the 
size of the tribal territory. Traditionally, the main resources of the Arab-Bedouins are 
land, while other resources such as education and employment are almost non-
existing. Land resources consist of strong social factors and are an important part of 
the Arab-Bedouins identity and cultural heritage. Therefore, losing access to 
traditional territories threatens their ability to sustain their culture, social structures 
and communal identities (Abu-Ras 2006; ILA 2005). 
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Within this context, the states policy to resettle the Arab-Bedouins in semi-urban 
localities promoted by the Sharon Plan is challenging Arab-Bedouins cultural, social 
and economic integrity. Among the 160,000 Arab-Bedouins currently living in the 
Negev desert some 80,000 live in seven state townships, while the remaining Arab-
Bedouins, who refuse to relocate, still reside in about 45 unrecognized villages, 
regarded as illegal by the government (Havatzelet 2006:4). The social conditions in 
the state townships are often less than adequate. For example, a lack of proper public 
transportation restricts the access of the Arab-Bedouin population to labour markets, 
higher education institutions and social services (NCF 2006a:19). In the unrecognized 
villages Arab-Bedouins are denied almost all state services, including connection to 
water, electricity and sewage grids (Saporta and Yonah 2002:99). 
The Jewish National Fund is a semi-governmental organization responsible for 
developing and managing land resources in Israel. The Jewish National Fund attends 
to issues concerning settlement and demography and is playing a key role in Arab-
Bedouins access to land resources. The Jewish National Fund is committed to the 
settlement of Jewish people in Israel. Together with the Israeli Land Administration 
the combined landholding power of these bodies prevents Arab citizens from buying, 
leasing or using over 75% of the land in the country (Yiftachel 1998:10). 
In contemporary Israel, Jewish ethnicity is a precondition for the membership in the 
political community, a reality that excludes non-Jewish ethnicities. A telling example 
of social exclusion of the Arabs in Israel is their exemption from military service. 
Considering that many social and economic benefits in Israel are associated with 
military service, not being able to take part in military service has a negative impact 
on their lives (Wollf 2004). Furthermore, Israels national identity has an excluding 
effect on the nonJewish citizens of the state. The state is not defined as the state of 
all its citizens, but as the state of the Jewish people, regardless of where they hold 
their citizenship. Consequentially, through semi-governmental organizations such as 
the Jewish National Fund (JNF), the state effectively marginalizes the non-Jewish 
minorities. 
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1.3 Objectives and Rationale 
The objective of this thesis is to explore the consequences of Israeli development 
policy on the social equity of the Arab-Bedouin community in the Negev and to 
examine the ways in which these policies are legitimized. The thesis draws attention 
to the interconnectedness of demography policies as exemplified in the Sharon Plan, 
as well as discusses the role of spatial control, settlement activity, and Israeli national 
identity. While exploring how national development policies in Israel impact the 
social equity of the Arab-Bedouin minority, this thesis explores the ways in which the 
construction of national identity and national myths in Israel is utilized by the 
hegemonic order, i.e. white, middle-class males, to legitimize the dispossession of the 
Arab-Bedouins in the Negev. Examining these issues will enhance the understanding 
of the issues surrounding the case and will help to generalize beyond the specific 
context of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev to other cases within and outside Israel. 
This thesis will also attempt to shed light on the mobilizing power of nationalism and 
its relevance to the problems of development. 
1.3.1 The Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter one opens by drafting the scholarly and the geographical context of the 
thesis. It presents the main issues discussed in the thesis, including a preliminary 
review of theory and a section about methodology. Chapter two expands the 
discussion of the theory, delving into theories of nationalism in an attempt to find a 
model that could offer some insight into the case of Israeli nationalism. This chapter 
discusses the nature and origins of nationalism and concludes with the examination of 
the historical ethno-symbolic approach. Chapter three, which pertains to the case of 
the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev, is divided into two sections. The first section 
discusses the role of land resources in the culture of the Arab-Bedouins and reviews 
the development of land tenure in Palestine/Israel. The second section describes the 
challenges development policies such as the Sharon Plan and the Wine Road Project 
pose to the social equity of the Arab-Bedouin community in the Negev. Chapters four 
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and five are the discussion chapters. Chapter four is designed to explain the states 
development policies in the Negev. Firstly, it examines and contests the argument that 
the states policies can be understood as attempts to bring modernization to the Arab-
Bedouin townships. Secondly, it links development policies to the issues of ethnicity 
and demography, articulating the connections between demography, settlement, 
security and national identity. Thirdly, it discusses how national myths are used to 
legitimize states policies within the context of land allocation and settlement activity. 
Chapter five continues the discussion of the Israeli national identity, exploring the 
challenges that Israeli polity poses to Arab-Bedouins social equity. While 
undertaking this task, the chapter untangles the construction of nationality and 
citizenship in Israel. Chapter six brings to a close the main issues touched upon in this 
thesis, and discusses post-nationalist and neo-nationalist sentiments in Israel and their 
relevance to national identity and spatial control. 
1.4 Introduction to Theory 
The discussion of the encounter between the Jewish settlers and the Arab-Bedouins in 
Israel/Palestine grows from the tension that exists between settler states and the 
local ethnic minorities over their physical and imagined spaces. This is why 
national and ethnic group identities are central to the discussion of conflicts, 
especially in the light of recent conflicts in places such as Eastern Europe, Chad, 
Sudan, Ethiopia and Angola. Conflicts between ethnic groups in the Middle East are 
also frequent, including ethnic groups such as Druze, Kurds, Armenians, as well as 
Jews and Arabs. The theoretical perspective applied to deal with the issues of group 
identities is the historical ethno-symbolist approach, formulated by Anthony D. 
Smith in the discursive debate about the nature and origins of nationalism (Smith 
1983, 1986, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2007). The main argument of the historical ethno-
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symbolist approach is that national identities are socially constructed by myth, 
memories, values, symbols traditions and sacred texts2 (Smith 1999:9). 
The historical ethno-symbolic approach proves to be relevant to the case at hand, 
since it provides a model for explaining the ways in which communities regulate their 
interests through mythical symbols of territory, ethnicity and landscape. At the core 
of this approach lie myths of golden age, ethnic descent and myths of ethnic 
sacredness. These narratives explain the prevalence and re-emergence of nationalism 
and national identity in the modern era (Conversi 2007:22). 
                                            
2 For example, the connections between sacred texts and the formation of modern nations may be 
found in the recovery of the German Nibelungenlied. Another example is the recovery of Karelian 
ballades and their correlation in the Finnish Kelevala, edited by Elias Lønnrrot in 1835 (Smith 2007). 
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1.5 Methods 
This thesis studies the mechanisms of spatial control, their consequences and the 
narratives used to maintain them, employed by the Israeli state to control the Arab-
Bedouins. While undertaking this task a strategy of particularization is adopted, 
moving from the meta level where abstract issues of national iconography are 
discussed to the micro level, examining the more particular issues concerning the case 
of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev. At the micro level, etic questions are 
progressively transformed into emic issues. In the process of narrowing down from 
abstract to particular levels, the study becomes progressively more focused, beginning 
with key issues identified prior to arriving to the field and tackling new themes 
stemming from the new information. 
The research activity includes a field work and the study of secondary materials such 
as text books, articles, NGOs publications, press releases, state statistics, archival 
records, films and maps. The chief method for collecting data in the field consisted in 
semi-constructed and open ended depth-interviews. During the time spent in the field, 
a variety of primary and secondary sources were used to gather and generate data, 
such as qualitative interviews, personal observations, physical trace evidence, 
conferences, the press and the media, spontaneous conversations with locals and daily 
trips to key locations in the studied area. A voice recorder was used to register the 
collected data. 
Issues relevant to the case study have often been perceived differently by 
governments, NGOs, academics and private people. This is why representatives from 
these different groups were included in the interviews. Purposeful sampling was used 
to select the informants, supplemented with snow ball sampling to locate 
informants from the Arab-Bedouin community. 
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The informants3 who were interviewed include NGOs such as Adalah Legal Centre 
for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Bimkom-Planners for Planning Rights, the Council 
for the Unrecognized Arab-Bedouin Villages in the Negev, Physicians for Humans 
Rights and The Society of Nature Protection. The official sources include a manager 
in an Arab-Bedouin city council and an executive in the Ramat Negev Regional 
Council. In addition, three Arab-Bedouins from the Azazme tribe and three Jewish 
local farmers were interviewed. I have also spoken with two Jewish academics, 
including an historian from the University of Haifa and an anthropologist from Ben-
Gurion University in the Negev. These informants, both from the Arab-Bedouin and 
the Jewish sectors, were chosen due to their professional, private or academic 
acquaintance with the issues concerning the case study. 
The Arab-Bedouins as well as the Jewish farmers who were interviewed were 
selected according to their geographic proximity to spatially stressed areas. The 
latter are localities where the expansion of an Arab-Bedouin village is frustrated by a 
variation of spatial mechanisms. The parameters used to identify these locations 
include distance from mining sites, nature and national reservations, planted areas, 
military zones, industrial areas and chemical dumpsters. The spatially stressed areas 
were selected using data retrieved from the Geospatial Information System (GIS), a 
computer program systemized to store, share, analyze and manage geographic data. 
The data was used to generate a map in Photoshop which helped to determine key 
locations for exploration. The Arab-Bedouin informants who were interviewed are 
members of the Azazme tribe which has been long involved in land disputes with the 
Israeli state. These informants included a social worker, a member of a school board, 
a local leader and an activist. 
During the field work, trigulation was used to ensure the collection of valid and 
reliable data. Trigulation was exercised by cross examining the source and quality of 
the data gathered, through interchangeably using interviews, direct observations, 
                                            
3 See Table 1 for a complete list of the informants. 
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document review and member checking, allowing the informants to read and 
comment on the content of the interviews conducted with them. 
In the process of gathering and analysing the data, qualitative and interpretative 
methods were used; an interpretative approach to the politics of nationalism and 
historical analysis were adopted to examine the impact that Israels development 
policies have had on the lives of the Arab-Bedouin community in the Negev. Since 
the phenomena explored involve strong emotions which are hard to measure 
empirically, the emphasis was on qualitative methods. In addition, a reliable account 
of the various meanings of the case has required studying the different actors in their 
natural settings and recovering meanings of texts and speeches in the intentions of 
their authors. 
1.5.1 Choosing the case study 
Spending time in the field proved essential for gaining rigorous understanding and 
personal familiarization with the political, physical and cultural aspects surrounding 
the relations between national identity, development policies and social equity in the 
Negev. The decision to study the case of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev has been 
justified by this cases potential to shed light on the broader nature of decision 
making in Israel and on the connections between development and ethnicity. 
Beyond the local circumstances of the Negev region, the case of the Arab-Bedouins is 
a prism through which the relations between the state of Israel and its variety of 
ethnical minorities may be examined. The case was thus chosen not for being unique, 
but for being typical and exemplary, and hence capable of offering an insight into the 
historical, cultural and ethical characteristics of the relations between the Israeli state 
and its ethnical minorities. In short, the study is designed to optimize the 
understanding of the case of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev in order to enable a 
(future) comparison with other similar cases of internal colonization within the 
context of ethnic-democratic states and their relations with their ethnic minorities. 
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Focusing on a single case study for only 6 weeks was far from an ideal research 
situation. However, resources such as the length of study, time and finances did not 
allow for a lengthy exploration of the case. With all these limitations, the case of the 
Arab-Bedouins in the Negev proves to be highly emblematic of the relations between 
demography, development and ethnicity in Israel. 
1.5.2 Setbacks 
Knowledge filters such as the authors gender and social status had an impact both 
on the quality of the interviwes and on access to informants. Being white, middle-
class academic Israeli, unavoidably influenced the informants attitudes and responses 
during the interviews. In addition, being a male prevented interviewing Arab-Bedouin 
females, as the social code of this community forbids such interaction. Another factor 
influencing the access to and the sampling of informants was the fact that during the 
week days many young Arab-Bedouin men work in the cities. This meant that the 
informants who were interviewed consisted of mostly older men. 
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2. In Search of a Theory 
2.1  In the Desert there is neither God nor Government 
While addressing the issues of land conflicts and internal colonization, a question 
arises: How does one group of people legitimize the deprivation and exclusion of 
another? In answering this question, one may use a variety of possible theories 
emerging from fields such as Cultural Studies, Economics and Marxism. 
One mode of explanation emerges from the field of Cultural Studies, explained by 
Avinoam Meir in As Nomadism Ends (Meir 1997).  Meir argues that the imposed 
restrictions on pastoral societies who live within industrial states stem from the 
struggle between the desert and the town, an eternal tension between settlers and 
nomads that derives from the different social structures of these societies. According 
to this argument, the modern state operates in a way that can be described as 
centripetal circles, meaning, attempting to centralize power, while the social 
structure of pastoral societies is formulated around the principle of centrifugal 
circles, resisting the centralized power of the state by expressing loyalty to 
customary law (Meir 1997; Meir and Zivan 1998). In the Arab-Bedouin case, the 
popular idiom in the desert there is neither God nor government expresses the 
traditional Arab-Bedouin resistance to external powers (17.12.06, Interview in 
Rahat). This resistance demonstrates why the different regimes in the area have 
repeatedly tried to control and limit the Arab-Bedouins access to land (Goering 
1979). A different mode of legitimizing the spatial control is expressed in the 
following quote: 
 We should transform the Bedouin into an urban proletariat in industry, 
 services, construction and agriculture (). This will be a revolution, and it 
 may be [achieved] within two generations (Moshe Dayan, quoted in HRA 
 2003:3). 
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Reading the quote, one may be drawn to the conclusion that the conflict between the 
state and the local people is a result of the governments attempt to incorporate 
pastoralists into the labour market (Rosen-Zvi 2004). However, both the cultural and 
the economic explanations fail to address the more essentially relevant issues of the 
construction of social boundaries and of national group identities. 
In recent decades, the struggle over land resources in Palestine has taken a nationalist 
form, as both Arabs and Jews became increasingly territorial (Yiftachel 2002). The 
concept of national group identity, which has received considerable amount of 
attention in political science, social studies and international relations, is essential 
when one seeks an understanding of how domestic violence, colonization and spatial 
control are being justified by the hegemonic order, allowing it to restrict minorities 
access to the common good (be it water, food, or land). Accordingly, in order to find 
out how issues of group identity can shed light on the case of the Arab-Bedouins in 
the Negev, this chapter delves into theories of national identity, i.e., nationalism. It 
should be noted that, while nationalism is a research area divided between many 
specialized disciplines such as history, political science, sociology, cultural studies, 
anthropology, psychology and geography, (Gellner 2006:40) and encompasses an 
extensive amount of academic materials, the literature reviewed in this chapter covers 
only the most relevant theoreticians and does not pretend to be a comprehensive study 
of nationalism. 
One question central to the discussion of nationalism is whether it is an ancient 
phenomenon, or whether it is a modern development. This question, which is central 
to the discussion of nationalism and ethnicity, is especially pertinent when 
considering the encounter between the Zionist nation building project and the Arab-
Bedouins in the Negev. The dilemma needed to be unravelled is whether development 
in Israel is instrumental for the revalidation of Zionist ideology, or whether Zionism, 
understood as a socio-political movement, is instrumental for social and economic 
development. To put in a different way, in order to decode the rhetorics and practices 
linked with governmental development policies in the Negev, it is important to know 
whether the mobilizing force behind state policies in Israel is economic growth, or 
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whether this force is rooted in the domain of national identity. If the Zionist national 
movement is a modern development generated to fulfil the needs of an industrial 
society, than one may conclude that in the Zionist case nationalism is instrumental to 
development. On the other hand, if one concurs that the modern phenomenon of 
Zionism is rooted in ancient ethnic identity, one can well argue that development is 
used in the Israeli case to enforce and reinforce the Zionist ideology. 
2.2 How old is the Nation? 
 There is no disagreement that nationalism has been around () at the very 
 least for two centuries. Long enough, one might think, for it to be readily 
 understood. But it is hard to think of any political phenomenon which 
 remains so puzzling and about which there is less analytic consensus 
 (Anderson, quoted in Yiftachel 2002:243). 
Nationalism is a field marked with conflicting ideas, over which there is little 
agreement among scholars. For instance, in the 1950s Elie Kedourie understood 
nationalism as a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, while in the 1970s he shifted his perspective claiming that nationalism is 
based on mythical ideas of the nation as an ethnic community (Gellner 2006:19). This 
demonstrates the disagreement expressed in the literature about the way the 
nationalist processes work. It is especially hard to find agreement on the questions 
whether nationalism has an ethnic core (i.e., do nations have a navel?) and whether 
nations came before or after nationalism. It seems like the only issue most 
theoreticians agree on is that nationalism is a social or political movement born in 
Western Europe and in America between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries 
(Smith 1999:115). The issue of national identity received wide attention in the 
literature and has been problematized by leading theoreticians in the field of 
nationalism, such as Benedict Anderson (1992), John Armstrong (1982), Ernest 
Gellner (1998), Eric Hobsbawm (1996) and Anthony D. Smith (1986) to name but a 
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few. The question of the origins of nationalism is an issue that has been contested by 
these scholars, and which can, once scrutinized, provide a model for understanding 
how societies manage their interest, especially with relation to ethnic conflicts, 
whether they occur in the Caucasus, the Horn of Africa or in the Middle East. The 
issue of nationalism is problematic in the sense that it is highly political; even today, 
it easily creates conflicts, whether it is between Tamils and Sinhalese or Serbs and 
Bosnians (Smith 1986). Following Conversi (2007), the approaches to the origins of 
nations and nationalism are divided here into two schools: primordialism and 
modernism. The following poem, written by Rudyard Kipling, may be used as an 
introduction to the discussion of primordialism. 
 Our hearts where they rocked our cradle 
 Our love where we spent our toil 
 And our faith, and our hope, and our honour 
 We pledge to our native soil 
 GOD gave all men all earth to love 
 But since our hearts are small 
 Ordained for each one spot should prove beloved over all 
 (Rudyard Kipling 1865-1936). 
Kiplings poem expresses the primordialist notion that the nation is a universal 
phenomenon, as real as the human body and as natural as the gravity force and 
that it is linked with spiritual and emotional bonds to a demarcated beloved over all 
territory. The primordialist view, which is the most archaic among the different 
approaches to nationalism, contends that the world consists of organic nations and 
that nationalism is based on ethnicity which functions as an extension of kinship, and 
therefore can be traced back to ancient human history (Smith 1986:12). In that sense, 
Huntingtons The Clash of Civilizations can be seen as an example of modern 
primordialism, where different civilizations are engaged in cultural struggles (Allen 
and Eade 2000:500). Accordingly, the role of nationalism is to wake nations to 
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rediscover their forgotten national self-consciousness and to achieve territorial 
independency (Smith 2000:146). Steven Grosby suggests that primordialism refers 
to the significance of vitality which men attribute to and is constitutive to, both 
nativity and structures of nativity, including kinship and most significantly territory 
(Quoted in Conversi 2007:15). The primordialist school contends that ethnic 
affiliations are given rather than chosen, defining ethnic groups as super families 
related to each other by birth. An extreme form of primordialism adopts a socio-
biological perspective, asserting that nations are constructed of people sharing the 
same genetic material. This suggests that people sharing similar cultural attributes are 
descendants of the same ancestor and that myths of common origin actually match 
biological similarities (Smith 2000:148). Related to the stance described above is the 
idea that primordialism is a universal phenomena, and that nations and ethnicity are a-
historic. This means that under the primordialist view nations have always existed, 
carrying through time the unchanging identity of the nation as part of the natural 
order of things. 
Fredrik Barth, a Norwegian social anthropologist who studied the issue of group 
identity found nationalism to be a cultural phenomenon, where manipulation of 
cultural differences creates real territorial and social boundaries (Ritzer and Smart 
2001:477). Following Barth, a theory for explaining nations and ethnicity was 
suggested by John Armstrong in Nations before Nationalism (Armstrong 1982). 
Armstrongs analysis of medieval Middle Eastern European civilizations and ethnic 
identities suggests that The key to the significance of the phenomena of ethnic 
identification is persistence rather than genesis of particular patterns (Armstrong 
1982:4, emphasis is mine). Armstrongs analysis implies that ethnicity is maintained 
by cultural and social boundaries, rather than common ancestry. This position was 
further developed by the modernist school. 
The modernist approach is the most widely held theory among contemporary theories 
of nationalism, contending that nationalism cannot emerge outside modernity (in 
whatever form the later is defined) (Conversi 2007:18). In his book Imagined 
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Communities Benedict Anderson (1936- ) exemplifies the role that bureaucracy and 
modernization take in the process of shaping nation states, while attributing an 
imagined element of old age to the national community (Anderson 1992). Anderson 
argues that an essential element in the construction of a nation is its existence as an 
imagined community which shares a common history (the what of the nation), 
long before it reaches a territorial realization (the where of the nation) (Ibid). 
Imagined communities, which are considered by Anderson to answer the economic 
and psychological needs of modern societies, are explained as products of secular 
modern capitalism. Anderson associates nationality with the decline of religion, the 
disappearance of Latin as a spoken language, and with the rise of printed press: 
conditions which made it possible for the elites to spread national ideas in an attempt 
to mobilize people (Ibid). Similarly, Bernhard Giesen finds nationalism to be a 
doctrine codified by elites who sought to mobilize the masses or in other cases, 
sought to provide a system of legitimization for a political order (Quoted in Ritzer 
and Smart 2001:476). The question of national invention or continuity has been 
lengthily debated by three leading theoreticians in the arena of nationalism: Ernest 
Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and Anthony D. Smith. 
Ernest Gellner (1925-1995) developed a theory based on a functionalist analysis of 
the relationship between economy, culture and politics in the age of industrialism 
(Gellner 1998). According to Gellners theory, nationalism is a product of modernity, 
rising as an answer to modern industrial societies need of communal homogeneity 
(Gellner 2006:43). Gellner argued that nations are the artefacts of mens convictions 
and loyalties and solidarities () (Ibid:7) and, nations can be defined only in terms 
of the age of nationalism rather than, as you might expect, the other way around 
(Ibid:54). Following Gellners perspective, it may be concluded that it is the political 
or cultural will of men that conveniently creates the notion of the nation and that 
nations are culturally constructed products which have roots neither in ancient times 
nor in real ethnic pasts. 
By postulating that nationalism is not awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it 
invents nations where they do not exist (Gellner 1964:168), Gellner rejected the 
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primordialist idea that the world is made of natural nations and that nationalism is a 
movement which concerns the revival of national self-consciousness. Gellners stance 
is echoed in Erick Hobsbawms (1917- ) theory of political nationalism, claiming 
that nationalism is a political tool in the hands of the hegemonic social elites. The 
elites, Hobsbawm argues, invented national traditions in order to mobilize the masses 
to form nation states. National traditions are often found in historiographical texts, 
which include fancy as well as fact, for instance, in ancient Israel (the Jewish Bible), 
in sixth century Sri Lanka (the Mahavasama), eighth century Japan (the Nibon Shoki),  
eleventh century medieval France (the Song of Roland) and Geoffreys twelfth 
century (History of the Kings of Britain) (Grosby 2007). As a consequence, by 
creating traditions, the elites were able to maintain their social status and economic 
superiority (Hobsbawm 1996:7). For Hobsbawm, the nation, ethnicity, national 
symbols and myths, traditions and nationalist sentiments rest on exercises in social 
engineering which are often deliberate () (Smith 1999:165) and were selected, 
written, pictured popularised and institutionalised by those whose function is to do 
so (Hobsbawm 1996:13). In other words, nationalists assembled symbols, myths, 
languages and historical fictions of different origins, communicating them through the 
media to create an imagined community, the kind that Anderson describes. In 
summary, in the vein of Fredrik Barth who thought national group identity to be a 
matter of establishing territorial and conceptual boundaries, thinkers like Anderson, 
Gellner and Hobsbawm, who belong to the modernist school, resist the primordialist 
argument that nations have an ancient natural ethnical core. Instead, they find 
nationalism to be a cultural artefact of the industrial era. 
Trying to apply the modernist approach on the Israeli case, seeking an understanding 
of the nature of Israeli nationalism, one is immediately faced with pending 
difficulties. Hobsbawm and Gellners instrumental approach to modernism professes 
that nationalism emerged as a response to the new psychological and social needs of 
industrial societies, as people moved from rural areas into the cities (Gellner 1998). 
Reading the Zionist project of building a home for the Jews in Israel/Palestine 
through this modernist eye-glass, Zionism may be understood to be formulated 
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around the need to adjust to the age of industrialism and its new conditions. However, 
this approach does not explain the Zionist diaspora nationalism which did not wish 
to transform peasants into proletariat, but the other way round, attempting to transfer 
the urban Jewish European merchants and small free traders into peasants and farmers 
(Gellner 2006). Therefore, the answer to the question whether Zionism is 
instrumental for development or the other way around has to be searched for 
elsewhere. 
2.3 The Historical Ethno-Symbolist Alternative 
A different critique of Gellners modernist mode of understanding nationalism was 
offered by Anthony D. Smith, who formed the historic ethno-symbolist approach. 
Smith argues that Gellners attempt to explain nationalism as a force rising to realize 
modern need in social homogeneity is in fact a functionalist fallacy and overly 
deterministic. Smith insists that events do not happen simply because of an 
historical need (Smith 2000). In contradiction to Gellner, Smith argues that 
industrialization is not a prerequisite for nationalism, considering cases such as 
Finland, Serbia, Ireland, Mexico or Japan, where national awakening was not linked 
to industrialism nor to capitalism (Conversi 2007:19). Smith conceives nationalism to 
be the expression of peoples will to maintain their identity by drawing on the 
cultural resources of pre-existing ethnic communities and categories () (Smith 
1999:18). Smiths theory of the historical ethnosymbolism builds on the debate 
between modernist and primordialists of how to explain nationalism, whether as a 
modern phenomena with roots in industrialization, capitalism, democratization and 
bureaucracy, or as a natural phenomenon with roots in distant past. Consider for 
example Hobsbawms account of the Zionist call to settle Jews in the Land of Israel: 
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 It is entirely illegitimate to identify the Jewish links with the ancestral land 
 of Israel, the merit derives from pilgrimages there, or the hope to return there 
 when the Messiah comes- as he so obviously had not come in the view of the 
 Jews- with the desire to gather all Jews into a modern territorial state situated 
 on the ancient Holy Land  (Quoted in Smith 1999:222). 
In his book Chosen Peoples (2003) Smith refers to the concept of ethnic cores, 
which he terms ethnie, where he argues that these existed in pre-modern times and 
can be linked to the origins of many contemporary nations (Smith 2003). In line with 
Smith approach, agreeing with Hobsbawm argument means downplaying eighteen 
centuries of historic spiritual link between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel, 
as expressed in prayers and rituals4. 
While looking to conceptualize the formation of nations and nationalism, modernist 
scholars such as Anderson, Barth, Gellner and Hobsbawm explain nationalism as a 
modern phenomenon born in Western Europe and America in the late 18th century. 
These modernist scholars have understood nationalism to be a response to the needs 
of modern societies in homogeneity, supporting capitalism, bureaucracy and 
industrial growth, thus holding that nationalism creates nations and not the other way 
around. Balancing the modernist approach with the primordialist perspective Smith 
suggests the historic ethno-symbolist approach, a synthetic model balancing the 
influences of ethnic past with the importance of modernism (Smith 1999). Smith 
writes: 
 New states, often top-heavy and fragile, are anxious to establish their 
 national credentials, especially when they lack any semblance of common 
                                            
4 For example, such a tradition is demonstrated in the breaking of a glass during a Jewish wedding 
ceremony, a symbolic act meant to mark the spiritual connection of Jews to Zion (Jerusalem) and to 
express the hope of rebuilding there the Temple. Another demonstration of the sense of Jewish unity 
and spiritual link to the Land of Israel is expressed in the Jewish holiday Passover, where Jews 
repeated the same Hebrew ancient text, praying to reach Jerusalem in the following year (Rubinstein 
1967). 
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 ethnicity () without myth and memories nations are just people bounded 
 in political space (Smith 1986:2). 
To conceptualize and contextualize Smiths synthetic model, it is useful to take a 
moment to look at the formation of Israeli society. Israeli society could be regarded as 
an imagined community, consisted by at least seven diverse cultural-ethnic groups, 
among them Ashkenazim (European), Mizrahim (North African), Russian and 
Ethiopian Jews, who are living together with Muslim, Christian and Arab-Druze5 
(Kimmerling 1983). What make the aggregated human components of the young state 
into a nation are myths, symbols, canonic texts, songs and collective social memories 
of shared ancestors. For example, in Israel, Arab and Jews assume to share a common 
origin, colloquially referring to each other as cousins, believing to be the siblings of 
the two brothers Esav (Esau) and Jaakov (Jacob) respectively, the forefathers of the 
two nations (Kimmerling 1999). Similarly, the Jews colloquially refer to each other as 
brothers and sisters, as expressed in the common phrase kol Israel Ahim (all Israel 
is brothers and sisters), assuming to share the same forefather Avram/Abraham 
(High Father). 
A critique of Smiths ideas is offered by Oren Yiftachel, who argues that nationalism 
should not be readily understood as a force acting like a glue in homogenizing distinct 
societies, or as a force that moves to merge the state and the nation, but as a force that 
acts to maintain the tension between etno-national belonging and formal citizenship 
() (Yiftachel 2002:222) consequently separating the identity of the state from the 
identity of the nation. According to Yiftachels analysis, nationalism in the Israeli 
case should be understood as an excluding force rather than a merging force as argued 
by Smith. 
                                            
5 Ashkenazim are Jews from European or North American Origin. Mizrahim (also Sephardim) are 
Jews from North African or Middle Eastern origin who settled in countries like Iraq and Yemen after 
being deported from Spain in 1492. 
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Re-examining the Israeli case adopting Yiftachels perspective, one comes to realize 
that while nationalism is perceived as a homogenizing force by scholars like Gellner 
and Smith, it can also be an isolating and excluding force. Used by the hegemonic 
order to secure the separating of state from nation, ethnic minorities are effectively 
marginalized, since, although they may be citizens, they are not part of the nation. 
2.3.1 Summary 
From the historical ethno-symbolic standpoint, Zionism may be regarded as a modern 
manifestation of a primordial Jewish claim over the Holy Land. Accordingly, the 
Zionist ideology is seen not just as a contemporary phenomenon which was born in 
order to answer the changing life circumstances of modernism, but also as an 
expression of ancient Jewish ethnical territorialism. Considering the relations between 
Zionism and development, one may argue that development has both an inherent 
and instrumental values. On the one hand, development initiatives in Israel are used to 
implement the Zionist ideology, i.e. maintaining the Jewish nature of the Israeli state. 
On the other hand, developers and policy makers are using Zionist idioms to 
legitimize and de-politicize their decisions. 
Trying to find an answer to the question posed in the beginning of the chapter, i.e., 
what is the nature and origins of nationalism, ethnicity and national identities, this 
chapter has surveyed some of the leading theories in the study of nationalism. After 
delving into issues regarding the origins and nature of nationalism and its mobilizing 
potential, the most relevant approaches to the case study were marked, e.g., Smiths 
historical ethno-symbolist approach and Yiftachels critical account of the ethnocratic 
state. Putting together these approaches, a joint approach to nationalism emerges. 
This approach fuses both the homogenizing force of nationalism in forming an 
imagined community that is based on a socially constructed ethnic basis (the 
what of the nation which builds on values, social meanings, traditions, sacred texts, 
symbols etc.), and the excluding force of nationalism, which is used to establish 
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ethnic control of the landscape and causing the marginalization of other ethnic 
minorities from having access to the common good. 
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3. The Case of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev 
Poor people appear both as the objects of pity and humanitarian aid, as well as a 
threat to the social order (Alan 2000). Often, those who are especially burdened with 
poverty and diseases are the targets of racism, xenophobia and other forms of 
discrimination (Niezen 2003:134). While social exclusion and domination take many 
forms, this chapter aims at describing the influence of Israeli development policies 
and demographic design on the social equity of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev. 
Shading light on this issue, this chapter focuses on the various mechanisms of spatial 
control and how they constitute social exclusion. The main mechanisms associated 
with the dispossession of the Arab-Bedouins include (a) the deprivation of state 
services (b) house demolitions (c) destruction of crops and (d) construction of 
isolated farms. 
The discussion of poverty, social exclusion and the dispossession of the Arab-
Bedouins in Israel is associated with issues of land ownership and land entitlement. 
While current land policies fail to deal with the growing demand for land, pastoralists 
are losing control over their traditional areas (Forni 2006:1). Similar to other peoples 
in the world, Arab-Bedouins social equity is influenced by their ability to claim title 
over traditional tribal territories. 
Land is a key asset for both the rural and urban poor. Access to land and the ability to 
use it productively are essential for poor people world wide. Arguably, sustainable 
land policies are indispensable for the implementation of sustainable development. In 
some countries the state continues to own large areas of land, causing people who live 
in these areas to be vulnerable to threats of eviction (Deininger 2003). In Africa for 
example, the majority of land is handled under customary tenure, which until recently 
was not recognized by the state, effectively causing it to remain outside the official 
legal system. Land scarcity and high population growth, combined with a history of 
discrimination and unequal access to resources, may lead to struggles for land. The 
tension between territory and people and its implications for the rights of land is 
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amply revealed in examples such as the aftermath of the population transfer between 
Turkey and Greece in the 1920s, and in pre-independent Ireland where legal 
restrictions prevented Catholics from owning land (Goertz and Diehl 1991). Recent 
examples from East and West Africa, show that failure to end land conflicts at an 
early stage, especially if these conflicts involve people with different ethnic 
backgrounds, can lead to negative consequences (UNDESA 2007). 
In the case of the Arab-Bedouins, land has always been an important resource. Land 
ownership is associated with the integrity of Arab-Bedouins social structure. For 
instance, the social hierarchy between different tribes is set according to the size of 
the tribes dirah (tribal claim for traditional right of passage) (Abu-Ras 2006; Forni 
2006). This means that a tribes access to traditional territories is essential for 
maintaining group identity. Before 1948, approximately 90% of the Arab-Bedouin in 
the Negev earned their living from a mixture of agriculture and pastoralism. Even 
today, after the Arab-Bedouins of the Negev have gone through a process of 
sedentarization, the main resource they possess and prize is land. While other 
resources such as education or formal employment hardly exist, land plays an 
important role in the Arab-Bedouins identity and is thus relevant for the managing of 
its social equity (ILA 2005:34). For example, it is a common practice for the Arab-
Bedouins to live with their extended families. As a result, they require areas of land 
large enough to support two to three generations. In this perspective, losing access to 
traditional territories pose a real challenge for their ability to sustain their culture, 
social structures and economies. 
3.1 Managing the Land or Managing the People? Land 
Tenure in Palestine 
The word Bedouin derives from the word bedu (desert dweller) and is applied to 
Arab ethnic minorities of semi-nomadic groups traditionally inhabiting the desert belt 
of the Arabian Desert, Sahara, Sinai and the Negev (Meir 1997). The Arab-Bedouin 
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language is an Arabic dialect and their religion is Islam. The Arab-Bedouins in Israel 
are ethnically distinct from the Jewish majority, socially distinct from the Arab 
minority and politically distinct from the Palestinians living in the Occupied 
Territories (RCUV 2007). The population of the Arab-Bedouins in Israel counts 
530,000 people (8% of the Israeli population), out of which 160,000 live in the Negev 
(ILA 2006; Parawer and Sarphus 2006:8). The Arab-Bedouin population suffers 
poverty, high infant mortality rates, shortage in skilled professions and high crime 
rates. Approximately 40% of Arab-Bedouin children leave school before graduating 
and about half the population in the Negev live in Israels poorest towns (NCF 
2006a). 
Examining the origins of property and land rights, as well as their evolution over time 
is central for appreciating how Arab-Bedouins poverty and social exclusion are 
influenced by access to land. Accordingly, the historical background of the 
development of land tenure in the region is analyzed. 
3.1.1 Land of Plenty or Plenty of Land? 
Arab-Bedouin presence in the Negev desert (Naqab in Arabic) began in the 14th 
century when Arab-Bedouins began migrating to the region from the Arabian 
Peninsula (Meir 1997). In 1517, the Negev came under the rule of the Ottoman 
Empire. Under the Ottoman Empire the Arab-Bedouins were, for the most part, the 
sole residents of the Negev, counting around 90,000 people and holding about two 
million dunams (Rubinstein 1967:111). At the time, the land was divided according to 
the urf: a system of Arab-Bedouin customary land tenure, where land was transferred 
through inheritance without any written records (Abu-Ras 2006; Forni 2006; Symon 
2002). Land tenure, defined by the World Bank as social conventions that regulate 
the distribution of the benefits that accrue from specific use of a certain piece of land 
(Deininger 2003:22), was categorized into four classes by the Ottoman Empire: Mulk 
(private), Miri (state), Waaqf (public or religious trust) and Mawat (property of the 
sultan) (Abu-Ras 2006:2; Forni 2006:1). In 1839, the Sultan Mahmud the Second 
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enacted the Tabu Law as part of the Tanzimat Fermani (reorganization) 
modernization program, whose intention was to centralize power against landlords 
and to improve the quality of uncultivated wasteland, granting land ownership to 
those cultivating it (Creasy 1878). During the Tabu Law most of the Negev, which 
was classified as Mawat land, was defined as dead uncultivated land (Abu-Ras 
2006:4; Yiftachel 2003:32). According to the new law, certificate of ownership was 
granted to Arab-Bedouins who cultivated Mawat land, re-categorizing it as Miri (state 
owned land that could be cultivated for a single fee) (Abu-Ras 2006). In order for the 
ownership to be granted the names of land owners had to be formally recorded 
(Goering 1979:6). However, the Arab-Bedouins chose not to do so, wishing to avoid 
land-taxation to the Ottomans and military service in their army (Abu-Ras 2006). 
Consequently, many Arab-Bedouins were left with no official papers to prove 
ownership of their land. 
In 1917, the region fell under the British Mandate (1921-1948). In 1921, the British 
Mandate government issued the Mawat Land Ordinance Law, encouraging Arab- 
Bedouins to register their land. According to the new law the Arab-Bedouins of the 
Negev were given a period of two months to register their land. Those who registered 
were given a certificate of ownership, although many Arab-Bedouins chose not to 
register it. The British Mawat Land Ordinance Law contradicted the Ottoman Tabu 
Law, stating that anyone who cultivated wasteland would obtain no title to the land 
and could be prosecuted for trespassing (Shehadeh 1982:88), setting the ground for 
further marginalization of the Arab-Bedouins.   
3.1.2 Development as Demographic Hygiene 
After 27 years of British rule the Israeli state was founded and so in 1948, the Arab-
Bedouins became Israeli citizens. The Israeli state did not recognize Arab-Bedouin 
traditional land ownership and ruled that Arab-Bedouins who did not registered their 
land under the Ottoman Empire or the British Mandate, were denied legal ownership 
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of their lands (Abu-Ras 2006:3). As a result, much of the land previously held by the 
Arab-Bedouins was transferred to the hands of the Israeli state (NCF 2006a). 
After the Independence War/Naqba between the Israeli Defence Force and the 
neighbouring Arab countries in 1948, some 79,000 out of 90,000 Arab-Bedouins 
living in the Negev fled or were expelled from the country. Under the directions of 
Israel's first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, the 11,000 Arab-Bedouins remaining 
in Israel were uprooted from their current land and transferred to the north-eastern 
part of the Negev. This area was a restricted zone called the Siyag (enclosure), 
characterized by low rainfall and poor soil quality (Boteach 2006; George 1979; 
Gordon 2006).  (See Figure 1, Area of Research). 
Figure 1. 





Source: Israels Ministry of the Interior, the spatial information was used to create the map, 
using Geospatial Information System (GIS). 
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Continuing the discussion of the historical development of land tenure, in 1950, Israel 
passed the Absentees Property Law allowing the state to expropriate land belonging 
to Arabs no longer residing in Israel. Furthermore, in 1953, the state enacted Israels 
Land Acquisition Law, defining the criteria for annexing land to be either land that 
was not cultivated before 1952, or land that was required for national needs, such as 
military use. Since the Arab-Bedouins had been dislocated into the Siyag prior to this 
date, they lost their land even when possessing proof of ownership (NCF 2006a:10). 
During the 1950s and the 1960s, the Arab-Bedouins, like the rest of the Arab-
Palestinians in Israel, lived under tight military control (Boteach 2006; Goering 
1979). During this period, most of the Arab-Bedouins land was confiscated by the 
government (Hamdan 2005b; Rosen-Zvi 2004). Furthermore, in the 1970s, about 50% 
of the Arab-Bedouin population was pressured by the government to move into 
designated semi-urban townships, designed and built by the government in the 
northern part of the Negev desert (Gordon 2006). Those refusing to relocate into the 
townships remained scattered in rural locations in the Negev. Today, the rural 
locations, which are considered illegal by the government, are inhabited by more than 
80,000 Arab-Bedouins (Parawer and Sarphus 2006:8). 
3.2 Judaization of the Negev 
Land, being the primary factor of production, has been a major component of 
religious, economic, political and social aspects of human life. In the history of 
modern colonialism, states have often used frontier settlements as a strategy to 
expand national territories. For instance, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
Germany attempted to Germanize Prussias Poland by purchasing Polish farm land 
and resettling it with ethnic Germans. Although the newly settled farms were allowed 
to be sold, they were prohibited from being resold to Poles (Goertz and Diehl 1991). 
In Israel, ever since the state was founded, the Negev region has been the centre of 
governmental attempts to settle it with ethnic Jews. The Negev, it is said, is where 
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GOD first spoke to Abraham, and where monotheism began. The area stretches over 
13,230 square kilometres, constituting two thirds of Israels territory, and is the home 
of about ten percent of Israels population. During its first years, the Israeli state was 
under-populated. In this period, an undeveloped area was perceived as an enemy to 
be conquered (Chertok 1999). In fact, the Hebrew word Shmama (wilderness) is a 
synonym of backwardness (Borel et al. 2003). Indeed, the national challenge was to 
conquer the wilderness, manifested through erecting new settlements. With David 
Ben Gurion as Prime Minister (1948-1953; 1955-1963), the Negev grew in 
importance as new settlements and industries were built. In 1884, Ben Gurion 
claimed that, 
 The people of Israel will be tested in the Negev () only by settling and 
 developing the Negev can Israel, as a modern, independent and freedom 
 seeking nation, rise to the challenges that history puts before us () All of us, 
 veterans and new immigrants, young and old, men and women, should see the 
 Negev as their place and their future and turn southwards (Quoted in Yiftachel 
 2003:29). 
In line with Ben-Gurions vision of settling the Negev, the National Water Carrier 
was built, subsequently increasing the Jewish agricultural settlements and population 
in the area. From 1950 to 1963, the population of the Negev grew from less than half 
a percent of the states population to six and a half percent, as almost two hundred 
thousand Jews settled there (Chertok 1999). In the 1950s and 1960s new settlements 
were built in the Negev by the government in order to receive the new wave of Jewish 
immigrants from Middle Eastern and North African countries. However, after the Six 
Days War in 1967, the status of the Negev declined, as new frontiers opened in the 
Sinai Peninsula. In the 1990s there was another increase in population, as Russians 
and Ethiopians immigrants were directed to the Negev by the government (Meir 
1997). In 2003, another attempt to draw Jewish settlers to the Negev was initiated by 
Mr. Ariel Sharon, serving as the Prime Minister at that time. 
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3.3 Sharon Plan 
It is no longer resources that limit decisions; it is decisions that limit resources 
(Alvin Toffler 1928- ). 
In an attempt to develop the Negev and increase its population, the Sharon 
administration issued a regional development initiative called the Sharon Plan. This 
plan, a five year development program, sets forth a budget of 265 million US dollars 
for the promotion of national goals in the Negev. The plan announced that its goals 
were to change and to improve the situation of the Bedouin population in the Negev 
(Hamdan 2005b:3). The main aspects of the plan included (a) settling ownership 
claims with the Arab-Bedouins (b) completing the development of the existing seven 
state-built Arab-Bedouin towns in the Negev and (c) planning seven new towns to be 
settled by the Arab-Bedouins, currently residing in the illegal villages (Bishara and 
Rosenberg 2004). 
After witnessing the refusal by 80,000 Arab-Bedouins to move into the seven existing 
townships, the state initiated a strong hand policy, forcing relocation. The Minister 
of Industry and Trade, at the time Mr. Ehud Olmert, who was responsible for 
implementing the Sharon Plan, was quoted commenting that, we are talking about 
evacuating the Bedouins [from their rural localities into the towns], however, I 
assume they will absolutely oppose this plan (Bishara and Rosenberg 2004:9). 
According to the plan, the Israeli Land Administration (ILA) announced that it will 
act to fully implement the rule of law by enforcing the states rights for land, 
including taking actions against trespassers (Bishara and Rosenberg 2004:10). These 
actions include a variety of mechanisms; the first mechanism is the development of a 
legal framework designated to claim ownership over the disputed territories, currently 
occupied by Arab-Bedouins. The second mechanism is the demolition of houses 
considered to be built illegally by the Arab-Bedouins. The third mechanism is the 
development of isolated farms, a form of settlement where a single family leases 
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agricultural land from the state. In the following section the consequences of the 
states policy to urbanize the Arab-Bedouins are examined. 
3.4 Arab-Bedouins Social Equity 
 Social equity means the equal consideration of economic, environmental and 
 social needs and includes the rights of food and shelter, clean drinking water, 
 cultural and religious freedom, political participation and access to health and 
 education services (Parawer and Sarphus 2006). 
Cities have long been the symbols of civilizations. Adam Smith described urban cities 
as engines of national economic growth (Alan 2000). In social terms, urban centres 
have been characterized as attracting a variety of people, encouraging new forms of 
individual interaction (Beall 2000:425). According to David Harvey, urbanism can 
also be understood as a spatial expression of social relations based on power (Harvey 
1988). Pryer and Crook defined urban centres in contrast to rural areas, claiming that 
deteriorated urban infrastructure and services are responsible for poverty and health 
problems (Pryer and Crook 1988). Similarly, Howsam and Carter stated that a lack of 
access to services, such as clean water and sanitation, is both the cause and the 
symptom of poverty in low income urban localities (Howsam and Carter 1996). 
Furthermore, Jo Beal has noted that life in underprivileged cities is characterized by 
poor living conditions, such as appalling overcrowding, contaminated water, poor or 
absent sanitation, lack of services and the constant threat of () industrial pollution, 
mean that the urban poor are exposed to severe environmental health risks (Beall 
2000:432). Indeed, contaminated water, lack of proper sanitation and poor hygiene 
are major factors in causing death (Almi 2006). Accordingly, safe, secure and 
adequately serviced housing is crucial for people living in cities (Beall 2000:436). 
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3.4.1 Life in the Suburban Ghettos 
As previously mentioned, half of the 160,000 Arab-Bedouins living in the Negev 
currently reside in allocated townships, planned and built in the 1960s and the 1970s 
to accommodate Arab-Bedouins who were uprooted from their rural localities. There 
are seven towns, all located in the Siyag area: Hura, Kseifa, Laqia, Arara, Rahat, 
Segev-Shalom and Tel Sheva6. While these semi-urban centres were intended to 
accommodate the Arab-Bedouins with basic services and were subsidized by the 
government, they were planned without considering Arab-Bedouin culture and social 
structures. Consequently, the towns became pockets of deprivation, unemployment, 
dependency, crime and social tension (NCF 2006a:18). The towns suffer from a 
variety of disadvantages, including shortage of banks, post offices, public libraries 
and places of entertainment. As Mr. Salem Abu-Medigham, the manager of the Negev 
branch of the Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel explained, 
 There are no public libraries, not even in the high school. In the area where 
 I live now, there is no telephone connection. I pay my taxes like everybody 
 else in this country and I am entitled to the same services from the state as
 everybody else. There is no public transportation to Rahat. The closest bus gets 
 only to the gate of the town. There is only one bank and one post office for 
 45,000 thousands people, and the town is overpopulated () (02.12.06, 
 Interview in Rahat). 
Indeed, the towns are overpopulated, a situation causing social tension which is 
intensified by the fact that different tribes, traditionally occupying different territories 
in the Negev, were relocated to the same towns and sometimes even to the same 
neighbourhoods. The state townships positioned the Arab-Bedouins in social and 
economic isolation, described by Israeli activists as suburban ghettos. The policy of 
                                            
6 See Table 2, Population in the Arab-Bedouin Towns. 
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resettling them in the state towns is generally perceived by the Arab-Bedouins as 
unsustainable, as one Arab-Bedouin stated: 
 To have the Bedouins move into those townships, or to centralize them in a 
 new village, is tantamount to passing a death sentence on a long tradition and 
 a way of life (Goering 1979:19). 
Dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs has emerged in the form of reversed 
nomadism, where Arab-Bedouin families leave their houses in the townships and 
return to more traditional pattern of life in the Negev. Although such instances are 
few in number, they demonstrate the difficult living conditions in the townships 
(Falah 1989). 
The states official reason for relocating the Arab-Bedouins was to promote 
modernization and enable the provision of basic services in the towns (Rosen-Zvi 
2004). However, social equity in the townships is inadequate, as social and economic 
conditions are seriously lacking. In order to appreciate the challenges that spatial and 
development policies in the Negev pose to Arab-Bedouins social equity, the situation 
in the unrecognized settlements is examined. 
3.4.2 The Unrecognized Arab-Bedouin Villages in the Negev 
Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country (The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21). 
In a rapidly developing world, the area of the Negev where this study took place is a 
relatively underdeveloped region. Today, half the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev reside 
outside the state townships in about 45 rural localities. The unrecognized Arab-
Bedouin settlements, referred to by the authorities as the Bedouin Pzura 
(dispersion), are deprived of most state services, such as connection to water, 
sewage, electricity and road grids (ILA 2005:1). In 1965, the state enacted the 
Planning and Construction Law, redefining the land within the borders of the Siyag 
(the area the Arab-Bedouins were confined to during the Israeli military rule between 
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1949 and 1966 and the area where the seven townships are confined to) as 
agricultural lands (Svirski and Chason 2005). According to Israeli law, it is illegal to 
build houses on land designated for agriculture, consequently retroactively making 
the existing houses (outside the townships) illegal. Additionally, as the settlements 
were considered to be illegal by the government, the villagers had no local authority 
where they could apply for changing the status of their lands. The illegal houses in 
the unrecognized settlements involve all structures built outside the boundaries of the 
villages blueprint. All Arab-Bedouin villages refused recognition by the state lack a 
blueprint, resulting in every new house being built there automatically becoming 
illegal (Falah 1991:80). In 1981, the policy of denying the villages access to the 
national water and electricity infrastructures was enforced by issuing an amendment 
to the Planning and Construction Law (1965), making it illegal for the electricity and 
water companies to connect unrecognized Arab-Bedouins houses to the national nets 
(NCF 2006a). 
Attempting to force the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev to dislocate from their rural 
localities into the seven state planned urban centres, the state has used a series of 
mechanisms hoping to force sedentarization over the Arab-Bedouins. These 
mechanisms include denying state services in the illegal villages, house demolitions 
of the so called illegal structures, destroying Arab-Bedouin crops, and promoting the 
building of Jewish isolated farms. 
In 1976, the Green Patrol was created to fight the so called Bedouin infiltration into 
state lands (Adalah 2006a). During its first three years, Arab-Bedouins goat herds 
were reduced from 220,000 to 80,000. In 1950, the state enacted the Plant Protection 
Law, also known as The Black Goat Law, prohibiting the Arab-Bedouins to graze 
their herds on state land without a specific permission from the Ministry of 
Agriculture (Adalah 2006a). As an Arab-Bedouin man whose entire goat herd was 
confiscated by the authorities in 1983 testified: 
 The people from the Green Patrol took all my goats. The black goats are 
 forbidden. They issued the Black Goat Law so we wont be able to use the hair 
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 of the goat for making the tents. This is a big damage for us. Now the tent is 
 made out of plastic and needs to be replaced all the time. To make a tent from 
 goat hair was the honour of the Bedouin. The young people dont know how 
 we used to live in the past. This is the worst damage in the world. They 
 touched our honour, [dishonoured] our traditions, on top of ruining our 
 livelihoods (Edler 2006). 
3.4.3 House Demolition 
No one should be arbitrarily deprived of his property (The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, Article 17). 
The main mechanism used by the state to forward the transition of the Arab-Bedouins 
from the rural areas into the townships has been house demolitions. The Planning and 
Construction Law (1965) gave the authorities i.e., Israeli Land Administration (ILA), 
the legal right to demolish illegal houses erected in the unrecognized villages (Bishara 
and Rosenberg 2004). An Arab-Bedouin man whose house was demolished by the 
ILA described the event: 
 During the last Holocaust day, the inspectors and police officers arrived to the 
 area [of the El Ukbi living space, near Hura] to deliver demolition warrants 
 before demolishing the houses. While the police officers were working, the 
 horn [signalling two minutes in the memory of the victims of the Holocaust] 
 was sound, so they stopped their work, holding their clubs in their hands, and 
 stood still for two minutes, after which they continued their work. It was a 
 terrible day (Sober 2006). 
In an article from 1979, a house demolition was described: 
 Shots were fired in the air to scare them out of their houses, smoke bombs 
 were thrown and panic was created among their women and children. The 
 Bedouins were not allowed to remove personal possessions from the dwellings 
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 () clothing and jewellery were trucked away and dumped at a nearby 
 Bedouin cemetery. Dozens of families were left homeless (Goering 1979:17). 
Between 2002 and 2007, more that 500 houses, private businesses, livestock dens and 
tents have been destroyed by the government in the unrecognized villages (Forum 
2007). The current situation is becoming increasingly tense as Arab-Bedouins are 
unable to obtain building permits. Consequently, when construction takes place it is 
done without the appropriate permits, subjecting it to demolition. One Arab-Bedouin 
female exclaimed, nothing like this has ever happened before, we have lived here for 
300 hundred years and now they come and kick us out. I am going to stay even if I 
have to die here (Edler 2006). 
A different tactic used by the state to push the Arab-Bedouins into the towns was the 
destruction of agricultural fields using toxic chemicals. In 2002, the government 
ordered the spraying of herbicides on the fields of Arab-Bedouin farmers, accusing 
them of cultivating state land. According to the British Mawat Land Ordinance Law 
enacted in 1921 by the British Mandate, cultivating Mawat (state) land is considered 
to be a criminal offence. As a result, the state initiated a policy of aerial spraying of 
Arab-Bedouins crops using Round Up, a toxic substance designed to destroy 
weeds. As one Arab-Bedouin woman, who lives in an unrecognized village in the 
Negev testified, 
 The state has poisoned the crops using airplanes. They probably used a strong 
 substance because we got sick. At first, we thought it was an Iraqi chemical 
 strike. When the airplanes came I was terrified. I was alone with the kids and I 
 was very scared. I did not know what to do. I thought it was a chemical [terror] 
 attack. Only later I found out that it was the state, trying to destroy our crops 
 () we have nothing here. Do you see? They destroy everything. Why? (Edler 
 2006). 
Since 2002, the state has sprayed more than 28,000 dunams of wheat, barley and 
vegetables, in twelve unrecognized villages (NCF 2006a). In April 2007, after Adalah 
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Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel petitioned to the High Court against 
the state actions, the spraying stopped. However, the destruction of crops continues, 
not through spraying, but by tilling the soil just before the crops are ready for harvest. 
3.4.4 The Right to Health 
Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, 
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection (The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25). 
In the unrecognized villages there are no dentists, no optometrists, no mental health 
specialists and no health education (Almi 2003). Only about ten out of forty-five 
villages have health clinics and only six villages have Mother and Child clinics. Mrs. 
Amal Elsana Alhjooj, the director of the Arab-Jewish Centre for Equality, 
Empowerment and Cooperation noted that, 
 Because of the lack of health services in the unrecognized villages, women 
 suffer from the poorest health. [Because of] the lack of transportation and the 
 inaccessibility of health services it is mostly women who are denied their 
 right to health services (). Pregnant women often give birth on the way to 
 the hospital since the ambulances dont reach homes that dont have paved 
 roads leading to them () (Adalah 2005). 
In the mother and child clinics that do exist, the absence of electricity causes the 
services provided there to be insufficient, being incapable of keeping vaccinations 
refrigerated (Almi 2003). Meanwhile, infant mortality in the villages is more than 
triple compared to the Jewish community in the Negev7. In a report published by the 
state regarding infant mortality in Israel (2006), the large gap between the Jewish and 
the Arab-Bedouin populations was explained to be caused by the Arab-Bedouins 
                                            
7 See Table 3, Infant Mortality. 
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high rate of consanguineous marriage, (), religious prohibitions against abortion, 
even in medically recommended cases, as well as socio economic differences (NCF 
2006a). The states report ignores both the numbers and the equality of the 
infrastructures in the villages, such as access to clean drinking water and garbage 
disposal. 
The prime factor negatively effecting the residents of the villages is the lack of clean 
drinking water, causing a range of water carried diseases, such as pneumonia and 
diarrhoea (Adalah 2006b; Almi 2006). As most villages are not connected to the 
national water system, some Arab-Bedouins are left with the option of collecting 
water from water-outlets and storing it in non-sterile containers. A resident in the 
unrecognized village of El Hiran explains: 
 The situation in the village is very difficult; we are suffering a huge lack of 
 water. We are recycling water, for example, first we use the water for washing, 
 and then we use them again in the toilet. The water is not clean so we have to 
 boil them before drinking. We bring the water from a distance, several 
 kilometres away (Adalah 2005). 
The hospitalization rates of Arab-Bedouin children with water carried infectious 
diseases are three times higher compared to Jewish children living in the Negev (HRA 
2003:16). During the hot summer months, the shortage of safe drinking water results 
in dehydration (Almi 2006). As presented in the Table of Water Consumption, the 
annual consumption of a Jewish resident in Omer (Jewish town) is seven times higher 
than that of an Arab-Bedouin residing in an unrecognized village8. 
Another factor associated with the lack of state services in the unrecognized villages 
is the absence of waste management. As a result, waste accumulates outside the 
dwelling areas, attracting pests such as mosquitoes, flies, wasps, snakes, rats and 
cockroaches. In dealing with the waste problem, residents of the unrecognized 
                                            
8 See Table 4, Water Consumption. 
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villages often choose to burn their garbage, releasing toxic gases into the air, 
contributing to the prevalence of respiratory diseases (Almi 2003). 
In 1976, Ramat Hovav, a national hazardous waste treatment site was constructed 
fifteen kilometres south of the city Beer-Sheva, encompassing nineteen agro and 
petrochemical factories and a toxic waste incinerator pesticide. In 2004, the Ministry 
of Health published the findings of an epidemiological study, stating that cancer and 
mortality rates are 65% higher within twenty kilometres radius of the Ramat Hovav 
industrial zone, which is spread across 8,000 dunams of land. The unrecognized 
village of Wadi El Naam, where 4,500 Arab-Bedouins of the Azazme tribe reside, is 
located within five hundred meters of the Ramat Hovav site. The Ramat Hovav 
industrial zone, which spreads foul smells, causes respiratory problems among 
children in the village (Almi 2003). Protesting against the state policy, an Arab-
Bedouin activist bitterly noted that, 
 Only in one instance shall the Arab-Bedouins get their full and equal rights in 
 the Jewish state. Only if miraculously we stop occupying, needing or
 using any land. Then we shall receive what we truly deserve- the right of 
 breathing (Quoted in Yiftachel 2003:33). 
Similarly, an Arab-Bedouin man living in Wadi El Naam after being asked about the 
health situation in the villages commented that, 
 Almost every woman and child is suffering from breathing problems. Four 
 people from my family are suffering from asthma and others are suffering from 
 eye problems. And from the smells we are suffering all the time. If there will 
 be an accident [in Ramat Hovav], there is nothing that can protect us. You 
 cant isolate a tent against toxic gases (Shezaf 1998). 
High voltage electricity lines are stretched above Wadi El Naam, yet the village is 
not connected to electricity; the village is also located close to the national water 
carrier site, yet it is not connected to the water line. Furthermore, an oil storage site, 
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the Israeli electric company, and a military firing zone engulf the village, effectively 
restricting its development. 
3.5 Spatial Violence and the Enemy Within 
As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, the main objectives of the Negev 
development scheme called the Sharon Plan are to increase the population of the 
Jewish sector in the Negev, while transferring the Arab-Bedouin population living in 
the illegal villages into the seven state townships. So far, we have mentioned house 
demolitions, crop destruction, and denial of state services as the main strategies taken 
by the state to fulfil its goals. However, the state has one more weapon in its 
arsenal: the isolated farms. Isolated farms are a form of settlement where a single 
family lives on a large area of land. Currently, there are 59 farms in the Negev, spread 
across 81,000 dunams (NCF 2006b). Out of these 59 farms, 13 are built as part of the 
Wine Road Project, a development program initiated by the regional council Ramat 
Negev. 
On March 2004, the Wine Road Project was approved by the National Council for 
Planning and Building in Israel (NCPB). The plan is to build a total of 30 isolated 
farms in the Negev. The Wine Road Project is promoted as a tourist attraction in the 
northern parts of the Israeli desert between Beer-Sheva and Mitspe Ramon, offering 
local wines (hence the name Wine Road), home made cheese, lodging and access to 
scenic and historic sites. In its decision, the NCPB declared that its primal interest is 
to attract more people to live in the Negev, by developing tourist attractions that will 
also give the Negev an economic boost. According to the manager of the tourist 
department in the regional council Ramat Negev, who is also responsible for the 
promotion of the Wine Road Project, the goal of the development scheme is to draw 
Jewish population: 
 The main aim [of the project] is to increase the numbers of Jewish settlers in 
 the Negev. This is the approach decided by the state, which we try to 
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 implement on the local level. The isolated farms are a way to draw internal 
 tourism and eventually new people into the area (7.12.06, interview in Ramat 
 Negev). 
Increasing the numbers of Jewish population in the Negev is one aspect of the Wine 
Road Plan. Another aspect is using the farms to protect state land from being taken 
by the Arab-Bedouins, referred to by Mr. Ariel Sharon as alien elements (Hamdan 
2005a). The policy of protecting national land from alien elements, i.e., non-Jews, is 
implemented through internal spatial control and ethnic demographic design. The 
Wine Road Plan was initiated by the state to assert restrictions over the development 
of Arab-Bedouin settlements in the Negev and is supported by the states policy to 
relocate the Arab-Bedouins into the state built townships (Hamdan 2005b:1; NCF 
2006b). 
At a meeting between Mr. Ariel Sharon who was the Minister of National 
Infrastructure at the time, and the Agriculture Minister, it was agreed that isolated 
farms should be promoted as a means for safeguarding state lands (Hamdan 2005a). 
Allocating hundreds and sometime thousands of dunams to the Jewish farmers 
strategically located around Arab-Bedouin settlements implies that the isolated farms 
function as barriers, restricting the expansion of Arab-Bedouin villages. The Minister 
of Strategic Affairs, Avigdor Lieberman explained the strategy behind the isolated 
farms: we are talking about single individuals, who will guard extensive land areas. 
This is most effective () (Hamdan 2005b). Indeed, the farms are effectively 
restricting the development of the Arab-Bedouin settlements, dominating the space 
with fences, barbed wires, guard dogs and electrical gates. The farms, presented as 
tourist attractions, are supposed to be accessible for the public. However, free access 
to the area under the control of the isolated farms is denied, as most of these farms are 
surrounded with fences. 
Consider for example the case of the Arab-Bedouin village Beer Hadaj, which suffers 
a shortage in space. The area of the settlement is 6,550 dunams, home to some 5000 
residents from the Azazme tribe, located on road number 222, 23 km south-west of 
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Beer-Sheva. In 2004, the village, which until then was the largest illegal village in the 
Negev, was recognized by the government. The village was relocated to its present 
location after being uprooted by the government twice, once in 1944 and a second 
time in 1974, both times for reasons of national security and development needs. 
Despite the fact that the village was officially recognized by the authorities, it still 
does not receive state services, such as connection to the national water system. In 
contrast, the isolated farms, although inhabited only by a single family, receive state 
services such as water and electricity. In addition, the Jewish farmers receive 
financial help from the state for fencing the farms. Furthermore, Beer Hadaj is 
encircled by a nature reserve (Mashabim Sands), a restricted military zone, three 
Jewish settlements (Ashalim, Retamim and Revivim) and eight isolated farms 
(Kalinger, Zohar, Shalbi, Rota, Dankner, Glinka, Shchafim and Matnat Midbar) (see, 
Figure 2 Detailed Map of Research Area). As a result, the spatial development of 
the village is restricted. As mentioned earlier, the Arab-Bedouins often live together 
with their extended families. Lack of land reserves for building more residential units 
often means that families have to move from the village, or stay and suffer 
overpopulation. 
In summary, the isolated farms have three functions: (a) increasing the Jewish 
population in the Negev, (b) restricting the spatial development of the Arab-Bedouin 
villages and (c) causing the Arab-Bedouins to relocate into the state townships (Abu-
Ras 2006; Adalah 2006b; NCF 2006b). Included in the states attempts to control the 
space, reserving it for the exclusive use of the Jewish population, the state has 
initiated the construction of isolated farms: a form of settlement sought to answer the 








Source: Israels Ministry of the Interior, the spatial information was used to create the map, 
using Geospatial Information System (GIS). 
 
3.5.1 Summary 
The years of governmental neglect has resulted in a series of third-world niches in the 
midst of an affluent society, creating feelings of bitterness, anger and frustration 
among the Arab-Bedouins living in the state towns and in the unrecognized villages. 
While the states reasoning for dislocating the Arab-Bedouins into designated 
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townships was to create conditions that would enable the provision of basic state 
services, in fact, the reason was to concentrate them, preventing them from cultivating 
and claiming ownership of the land that was expropriated. This was done in order to 
ensure that the Jewish project of settling the Negev under the salient ethos of 
halutziut (pioneering) could be executed unchallenged (Abu-Sa'ad 1998; Yiftachel 
2003). In order to achieve its aim, the state has used a variety of legal, economic, and 
spatial mechanisms to enforce the sedentarization of the Arab-Bedouin population. 
Implementing its policy to force the sedentarization of the Arab-Bedouin population 
and to compel them to dislocate into the state townships, the Israeli state has 
controlled and restricted access to traditional resources, denied basic state services in 
the unrecognized villages, demolished houses, destroyed agricultural fields and 
promoted the building of isolated Jewish farms. As shown above, these various 
mechanisms of spatial domination had fundamental consequences on the social equity 
of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev. Facing the state attempts of dislocating them, the 
Arab-Bedouins of the Negev have adopted a strategy of sumud (steadfastness), 
resisting the state by hanging on to the land, trying to maintain normality under the 
circumstances. As the mayor of an Arab town stated in 1983: 
 Israel has taken our land, surrounded us with Jewish settlements, and made us 
 feel like strangers in our homeland (). The Jews do not realize, however, that 
 we are here to stay, that we are here to struggle for our rights and that we will 
 not give up our identity as Palestinians Arabs and our rights as Israelis (). 
 the more they take from us, the more we fight (Quoted in Yiftachel 2000:747). 
The Arab-Bedouin form of resistance, the sumud, is expressed in a poem by Tawfiq 
Ziyyad, We Are Staying Here: 
 Here, on your chest, 
 Here, like a fence, 
 Here, in your throat 
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 Like a piece of glass, like a sabar9 
 And in your eyes 
 Like a storm from the fire 
 We are staying here 
(Tawfiq Ziyyad 1978, quoted in Yiftachel 2002). 
                                            
9 Sabar is a cactus, adopted as a Zionist national symbol. 
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4. Mindscapes and Landscapes 
Trying to explain the relations between the Israeli state and its Arab-Bedouin ethnic 
minority, one is faced with a major difficulty: the official documents of Israels policy 
toward its Arab-Bedouin citizens are limited. One official document dealing with the 
states policy toward the Arab-Bedouins of the Negev is The Bedouins in the Negev, 
Policy, Setbacks and Recommendations, a report presented by Israel National 
Security Council to the Six Convention for National Security in 2006. In the report it 
is stated that, 
 () if the government was able to evacuate 8,000 settlers who were living in 
 legal settlements [Gaza Strip], it can in no doubt evacuate thousands of 
 Arab-Bedouin who live in illegal settlements10 (Translated from Hebrew, 
 Parawer and Sarphus 2006:2). 
It would be reasonable to ask, why does the state wish to settle Jews in the Negev 
while at the same time evacuating 80,000 Arab-Bedouins living in the so called illegal 
settlements? The first step in answering this question is presenting the authoritys 
official narrative for its demographic policy. The official story is one of a benevolent 
state, a state looking to improve the life of its Arab-Bedouin citizens. Israeli officials 
claim that the reason for dislocating the Arab-Bedouins from their current semi-
agrarian locations into designated urban localities is to develop the Arab-Bedouins. 
In this perspective, development is considered by the government to be inherently 
good and is closely associated with modernization and Westernization. 
                                            
10 The Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories are considered legal by the Israeli government, 
but in fact are standing in violation to international law. 
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4.1 Development as Westernization 
Israel has some similarities with Australia, where the legal status of the Aboriginals 
was based on the notion that the Australian state originated from the settlement of a 
terra nullius (empty land). In Israel, Zionists considered Palestine as an empty 
and desolated land. Erets Israel, or the Land of Israel, was perceived as a terra 
nullius, waiting to be redeemed by its true Jewish owners, after years of being 
neglected. Consider for example the description provided by the Israeli geographer 
Ben Arieh, in 1987, 
 It is important to stress that in the dispersed country whole areas were empty 
 of population, (), the image of emptiness and abandonment was amplified 
 by the poverty of peasants, commerce, craft and transportation (). They all 
 seemed to be backward and frozen in time (). In 1882, when the first Zionist 
 pioneers arrived, the first signs of change had already begun to appear 
 (Schnell 2004:569). 
The emptiness of the land of Palestine is perpetuated in Zionist literature and 
rhetorics, expressed in the infamous Zionist idiom: a land with no people for people 
with no land. The notion of the emptiness of the land was contrasted with the Zionist 
goal to modernize it. In Zionist mythology, the old uninhabited landscape 
represented the shmama (wilderness). At the same time, the new Zionist landscape 
was associated with progress and modernity (Azaryahu and Golan 2004:499). From 
the Zionist perspective, progress is understood as modernization and development is 
understood as following the footsteps of the West (George 1979). 
The idea of equating development with modernization and Westernization can be 
tracked back to the nineteenth century, where economic, social and political systems 
originated in Western Europe and North America have spread to South America, 
Asia, and Africa (Alan 2000:30). In colonial times, it was assumed that poverty may 
be contained by urbanization, which transfers low-productive subsistence agriculture 
to more productive modern industry (Wratten 1995). 
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The Zionist nation building project, aspiring to be seen as fundamentally Western 
with some Oriental features and not as fundamentally Oriental (Khazoom 2003), 
promoted the transformation of the pre-Zionist landscape into a strictly Jewish 
landscape, i.e., an ethnoscape. An ethnoscape, as defined by Smith, is where 
landscape, (), becomes an intrinsic element in a communitys myth of origins and 
shared memories (Smith 1999:150). The Zionist project involved transforming the 
landscape from an underdeveloped and primitive state into a more modern Hebrew 
landscape11. This transformation was practiced through renaming places, assigning 
Hebrew, often Biblical names to places already carrying names in Arabic. At the 
same time, Arab names were erased from Israeli official maps. Indeed, within the 
realm of national identity, the landscape of the other simply does not exist 
(Newman 2001:241). 
This transformation of the landscape into an ethnoscape is echoed in the Zionist 
ideology of hafrachat hashmama (making the desert bloom) and geulat karka 
(land redemption) (Goering 1979:12). The vision of making the desert bloom 
created national symbols and iconography around the landscape. A few of these 
mythical symbols celebrated a Jewish technological superiority in agricultural 
farming. For example, the water-tower is a prominent repeated motif in Zionist 
iconography, constituting a primal element of settlement landscape and a signifier of 
the modernization of the country (Azaryahu and Golan 2004). The Zionist supposed 
superiority in farming the land stood in contrast to the local Palestinian population, 
whose ability to cultivate the desert soil was doubted (George 1979). The alleged 
superiority of the settlers to exploit the natural resources was understood by the 
Zionists as a moral legitimization to assert control over these resources (Ibid). 
                                            
11 The word Hebrew is dissimilar to the word Jewish. Hebrew denoted a social class and the 
ethnicity of the ancient Israelites. Jewish is a religion, used by the Zionists in modern times to mark 
the boundaries of the nation, creating a symbolic gap between ethnic Jews and other minorities, such 
as the Arab-Bedouins. 
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The argument that lifestyle can be used as a tool to legitimize control over resources 
dates back to Weber. The Zionist doctrine, which was influenced by Western secular 
dogmas, was propelled by the idea that a civilized man () could cultivate the land 
because it meant something to him; on it, he accomplished, he built. For an 
uncivilized people, land was either farmed badly, (), or it was left to rot  (Edward 
Said, quoted in Hasson 1998:118). 
Indeed, Israeli officials claim that the governments policy towards the Arab-
Bedouins is to encourage and assist them to the full turning from a nomadic or semi-
nomadic life to a permanent settlement () (Goering 1979:8). According to the 
states official narrative, the raison detre for dislocating the Arab-Bedouins from 
their villages into the state built semi-urban townships is to benefit them both socially 
and economically and to provide the residents of the townships with modern life 
conditions. In the first page of the report written by Israel National Security Council 
in 2006, it is stated that, 
 The illegal settlements of the Arab-Bedouins prevent the urbanization and 
 modernization of this society, prevent the state from providing them with 
 adequate services and create a state of poverty that perpetuates itself 
 (Translated from Hebrew, Parawer and Sarphus 2006:4). 
As shown above, the state legitimizes its policy to uproot the Arab-Bedouins through 
equating social and economic development with modernization. Israel, a developed 
Western country, perceives the sedentarization of the Arab-Bedouins from a Western 
perspective. Accordingly, the state views their urbanization as positive. According to 
this logic, encouraging nomads to curtail their wanderings means helping them to 
advance their living standards and influencing them to settle down in urban centres, is 
equal to assisting them to become more civilized (Goering 1979). In this respective, 
by attempting to relocate the Arab-Bedouins into the townships, Israel is seeing itself 
as fulfilling a missionary role, bearing a kind of a white mans burden. 
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Nonetheless, having examined the life conditions in the townships, one has no choice 
but to doubt the sincerity of the states proclamation to modernize the Arab-
Bedouins. As discussed in the previous chapter, the life conditions of the Arab-
Bedouins in the townships are so abysmal that some Arab-Bedouins have chosen to 
leave behind their urban homes and move back into their traditional tents. Therefore, 
in order to understand why the government desires to relocate the Arab-Bedouin 
population while increasing the Jewish population, one has to look for answers 
elsewhere. 
4.1.1 Development as Lebensraum and the Demographic Demon 
 The Negev land is reserved for the Jewish citizens (). We must expel Arabs 
 and take their place () and if we have to use force, then we have force at 
 our disposal- not in order to dispossess the Arabs of the Negev and deport 
 them, but in order to guarantee our own right to settle in those places 
 (David Ben-Gurion, Israels first Prime Minister, in a letter to his son, 5 
 October 1937, quoted in HRA 2003:8). 
Since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), the compartmentalization of the world into 
nation states has formulated nations around territorial navels (Gross 1948). Indeed, 
the national identity of the Jewish nation is pregnant with sentiments of territorial 
demarcations. Demography, or the study of the relations between human populations 
and space, is tied up with the territorial discourse in Israel, where the basic consensus 
is that a Jewish state means Jewish majority (Newman 2001). Accordingly, areas 
densely inhabited by non-Jews (e.g., Arab-Bedouins) are perceived as a threat to 
(Jewish) national security. Mrs. Hana Hamdan, a legal attorney in Adalah Legal 
Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel has noted that the [Israeli] state must stop 
seeing the Arab-Bedouins as a threat to security. Till today, [with a bitter smile], 
every time an Arab-Bedouin gives birth, it alarms the Israeli interior ministry and the 
Israeli foreign minister () (Adalah 2005). 
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In view of that, the states desire to evacuate the Arab-Bedouins from their rural 
localities and replace them with Jews is arguably linked to the fear of becoming 
outnumbered (Rouhana 1997). This fear, which is publicly referred to in Israel as the 
demographic demon or the Arab problem, is used by the state to legitimize its 
policy, forcing the dislocation of the Arab-Bedouins. Consider for example the words 
of Mr. Ariel Sharon, prior to his term as the Prime Minister: In the Negev, we are 
facing a serious problem, about 1,3 million dunams of state land are not in our hands 
but in the hands of the Bedouin community (Translated from Hebrew, Abu-Ras 
2006:1). The reason why Sharon finds the fact that 9.8% of the Negev land is 
populated by Arab-Bedouins to be a problem, besides the fact that they are non-
Jewish, is linked to the notion that Arab-Bedouins loyalty to the Jewish state is only 
partial (Merom 1999; Rouhana 1997). 
Israel was born in war and since World War Two has been involved in more wars 
than any other country (Rouhana 1997). In a reality where some Arab countries 
define the destruction of the Zionist state as the Arab strategic objective and 
occasionally discuss the extermination of the Jewish citizens of Israel, Israeli-Arabs 
are perceived as a potential danger to national security (Merom 1999). The latter is a 
major concern in Israel, forming the base of Jewish consensus (Ibid). Indeed, Israels 
public discourse is laden with symbols, images, stories, songs and myths that elevate 
the importance of defending the country. As with religion, security issues in Israel 
raise questions of myth-building (Rouhana 1997). In conclusion, the reason for the 
states demographic policies is rooted in security issues which are deeply associated 
with issues of national identity. In order to shed light on the interconnectedness of 
Israels national identity, demographic policies and spatial control, the historical 
ethno-symbolic approach is adopted, scrutinizing how myths serve to mobilize public 
opinion and to legitimize states policies. 
 61
4.2 National Narratives and Settlement 
 Love of the motherland is acquired through knowledge () Geography, which 
 is the study of landscapes, not only teaches us landscape perspective but also 
 the understanding of its historical development and its present status, and 
 mainly the connection of people to their surroundings (Quoted in Schnell 
 2004: 566). 
This section attends to the question: how does one group legitimize the social 
dispossession and marginalization of another group? And more specifically, what are 
the mechanisms used by the Israeli state to legitimize spatial control and the 
discrimination of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev? In the process of answering these 
questions, the historical ethno-symbolist approach is adopted. This approach will help 
to shed light on the pervasiveness of national identity and social imagination over 
time and its re-emergence in modernity. Specifically, this section focuses on Jewish 
national narratives, and on the way these narratives have been utilized by the Zionist 
ideology to secure its policies of land acquisition and demographic design in 
Israel/Palestine. 
According to the historical ethno-symbolic approach, collective national identity, 
space, place and territory are mutually interconnected. Place is the concrete 
expression of mans dwelling in the world and his identity depends on his belonging 
to places (Schulz 1980:46). As a result, certain symbols, such as territory, are pivotal 
to the existence of identity, including national identity (Smith 1999). From the 
historical ethno-symbolic point of view, societies have a universal geographical 
significance. In other words, once symbolic systems are absorbed into the social 
memory of a society, territorial demarcations can resonant over considerable periods 
of time with large political and social consequences (German 2007:122). For 
example, during the German national revival, the Teutenburger Walad, the place 
where the ancient Germanic hero Arminius, prince of the Cherusci discovered his 
blood loyalty and defeated three Roman legions, was rediscovered and celebrated 
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in the form of a monumental commemoration (Schama 1996:87). But it was not just 
German history that was imagined in the first decades of the sixteenth century but 
also German geography, as simultaneously with the re-discovery of Arminius, came 
the mapping of the heimat, the German homeland (Schama 1996:95). Another 
example is Greece, where Hellenistic sites were reinvented as elements of modern 
Greek national identity (Kellerman and Azaryahu 1998). Similarly, many civilizations 
bear witness to territorial attachment over long periods of time, for example, the 
English vill, the Arab Watan and the Hebrew Nachala. For instance, the Jerusalem Ge 
Ben Hinnom (Valley of Hinnom, or The Valley of Death), where the fires that 
were originally designed to burn criminals and garbage, were later transformed into 
the flames of Hell (Grosby 2007). 
Arguably, national identity plays an important role in the formation of space and 
territory, specifically in frontier regions (Yiftachel 1996:6). Space involves not only 
the traditional geographical notions of fixed territories and boundaries, but also 
symbolic and abstract notions of place, at local, national and global levels (Schnell 
2001). National identity demarcates directions for territorialism and provides 
symbols, legends and myths, used in the construction of space and place. 
Accordingly, national narratives shape the managing of space and place, while at the 
same time, space and place re-enforce national identity (Kellerman 1996). 
The literature on nationalism often emphasizes the function of national myths in 
reinforcing solidarity among the members of society. As discussed earlier, national 
narratives and social myths, which are often codified by the social elites, consolidate 
control over people and resources (Anderson 1992; Gellner 1998; Hobsbawm 1996). 
National myths are often used to laden places with social memories of national 
contents, transforming these places into a key aspect in the cultural geography of 
nationalism (Zerubavel 1991). Indeed, as Azrayahu and Kellerman note, the 
symbolic loading of a place with historical myth amounts to the invention of 
tradition (Kellerman and Azaryahu 1998:10). According to Barthes, myth is a type 
of speech used by the hegemony to form social memory and to sustain the existing 
hierarchy by depoliticizing it, passing it from the realm of history to the realm of 
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Nature, where it appears to be axiomatic and unchallengeable (Barthes 1993:48). 
For instance, Bedes eighth century Ecclesiastical History of the English People and 
Georgys sixth century History of the Franks, were used later in history by the 
hegemonic power to utilize collective memory and enhance group cohesion, weaving 
together historical facts and fiction as part of the creation of these modern nation 
states (Grosby 2007). As a consequence, the elites were able to consolidate and 
legitimate their authority (Grosby 2007; Kellerman and Azaryahu 1998). In 
conclusion, myth may serve to advocate a certain course of action or to justify 
acceptance of an existing state of affairs (Kellerman 1996:364). This means that 
national narratives such as the myths of frontier settlement and pioneering may serve 
to legitimize the hegemonic social order and validate decisions of power holders in 
issues such as development policies and demographic design. 
4.3 Zionism and its Myths 
Zionism makes an interesting example of how tradition may act as a glue in forming 
cultural and political collective out of many culturally different groups of people. The 
Zionist ideology drew legitimization both from the history of the Jews as reflected by 
the Bible and from a bond to the homeland, Erets Israel (the Land of Israel). The 
Zionist movement strived to solve the Jewish problem, i.e., anti-Semitism and 
pogroms in Europe, through building a home for the Jewish people in their historic 
Fatherland. The land of Israel/Palestine was chosen out of ideological and religious 
reasons based on narratives such as the return to the (home) land from a forced exile 
of 2000 years, as mentioned in the Israeli national hymn (Kimmerling 1999:341). The 
modern national trend of the return to the Land of Israel persistently transformed the 
Exodus story to an ethno-symbol (Gal 2007:223); in contrast to the Egyptian beit 
avadim (house of slaves), later compared by Zionist socialists to capitalism, the 
Zionist ideal was that of rural labourers living in freedom. Hence, the Biblical story 
of the exodus of the Hebrew people was used by the Zionists to create public support 
in the building of Kibbutzim in Palestine (Ibid). Similarly, The Zionists adopted 
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Jewish agricultural holidays, e.g., Shavuot (Pentecost) and Tu Bi Shvat, using them 
to promote and validate the Zionist ideology. 
In ancient times, the Jewish holiday Shavuot celebrated the first fruits and the 
harvest. After the destruction of the Second Temple, the ancient agricultural festival 
was transformed into the anniversary of the giving of the Torah at Mount Sinai. Later 
in history the Zionists chose to emphasize the agricultural side of the festival, giving 
it nationalist and social meanings. 
The Jewish holiday Tu Bi Shvat is a ceremony of planting trees which dates back to 
the Second Temple era. In its Zionist version, the ceremony came to celebrate the 
Zionist ideology of geulat karka (land redemption) and kibush hashmama 
(conquest of the desert) (Gal 2007), meaning, transferring the land from Palestinian 
to Jewish hands. The Zionists propagated the saying of the sages: if the Messiah 
comes when you are planting a tree, first finish planting and only then go to receive 
him. Among the national narratives used by the Zionist to support the national 
project of building a Jewish nation-state in Israel, especially salient were the myths of 
halutziut (pioneering) and hityashvut (settlement). These settlement myths have 
had a far reaching impact on the justification of states policies in issues of land 
management and demography, e.g., building development towns for the Jews in the 
Negev frontier, building mitspim (communal settlements) in the Galilee area and 
restricting the development of Arab-Bedouin settlements. 
4.3.1 Settlement Myth 
Settlement myth is a certain type of geographical myth, assigning subjective meanings 
to places: one of the most important roles that landscape plays in the social process 
is ideological, supporting a set of ideas and values, unquestioning assumptions about 
the way a society is, or should be organized (Quoted in Kellerman 1996:366). 
As noted by F.J. Turner in The Frontier in American History, national collective 
identities are often formed and reinforced by territorial expansionism and frontier 
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settlements (Turner 1962). Settlement activity creates conceptions of space as a 
frontier and as an element in the process of nation building (Kellerman 1996:364). In 
fact, some of Israels basic values have focused on the concept of frontier settlement. 
In Israeli popular culture, the boundary was described as a wall separating good from 
evil and us from them. Simultaneously, the enemy was metaphorically described 
as a vulture, while the locus of the good was described as out-post like 
settlements, peopled by labourers and warriors (Hasson 1998:126). 
The Israeli nation-building project of establishing a national-territorial identity in the 
Land of Israel/Palestine was based on Jewish traditions, mythical texts and narratives, 
intimately linked to settlement in the frontier (Schnell 2001). Settlement frontiers are 
the regions in which settlement take place at the boarders of the settled regions, or at 
the national borders (Kellerman 1996:363). The Israeli national myth created the 
idealization of border settlements and mobilized public support in settlement activity 
(Hasson 1998:128). The national narratives and iconography of Israeli society abound 
in landscape representations and are formed around the nations frontiers, creating a 
geographical myth. Geographical myth was defined by Entrikin who argued that in 
mythical thought necessary conditions link events and their locations () Places and 
their contents are seen as wholes (Quoted in Kellerman 1996:363). These 
geographical myths can be categorized as myths relating to sites, e.g., the affair of 
Tel-Hai and myth related to settlement forms, e.g., isolated farms (Kellerman 1996). 
These national myths, which mystify past events, fuse history and landscape and 
define sacred history in terms of symbolic places (Kellerman and Azaryahu 1998). 
The tale of Tel-Hai is particularly laden with symbolic meanings of pioneering, self 
sacrifice and defending the homeland. 
4.3.2 Hail to the Glorious Dead. National Narrative: the Myth of 
Tel-Hai 
 Go, stranger, tell the Spartans that here, obedient to their laws, [they] lie (). 
 Having died, they are not dead; for their valour, by the glory which it brings, 
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 raises them from above out of the house of Hades (Simonides, quoted in Smith 
 2003:219). 
The sacrificial virtue of heroes, willing to die for their countries and fellow men is a 
main principle of the nationalist thought (Smith 2003:42). For example, heroes and 
heroines like Wilhelm Tell, Joan of Arc, Moses, David, Leonidas, Arminius, 
Alexander, Arthur, Wallace, or Saladin have all been cherished by nationalists, 
demonstrating the role heroes and patriots have in mobilizing the masses (Smith 
2003:41). 
In pre-Israel Palestine, the resistance of Arab countries to the Zionist enterprise tied 
the issue of Jewish settlement to that of security (Kellerman 1996), demonstrated in 
the following account of the affair of Tel-Hai. On March 1920, a battle between 
Arabs and Jews took place at the Jewish settlement of Tel-Hai in northern Israel, 
claiming the life of eight Jewish settlers (Zerubavel 1991). Among the dead was 
Joseph Trumpeldor, a veteran of the Tsarist army who had lost an arm in a battle. The 
memory of this local hero, who was an active Zionist and a well-known figure, is 
still pervasive in Israeli social memory. Trumpeldor was portrayed according to the 
image of the haluts (pioneer), a worker and a warrior who with one hand held the 
plough and with the other held his weapon12. The image of the haluts as a fighting- 
labourer draws legitimization from the Biblical description of the Jewish people who 
built the Second Temple around 520 BC. The Zionists drew inspiration from 
Nehemiahs phrase: with one of his hands each laboured in the work, and with the 
other hand he held a weapon (Gal 2007:225). The Tel-Hai affair and Trumpeldors 
alleged last words it is good to die for our country were elevated by the Zionists to 
a national myth and were used to propagate settlement activity and pioneering in 
Palestine. As both a place and a myth, Tel-Hai became a symbol which was used to 
                                            
12 Since Trumpeldor had only one arm, he was portrayed as holding both a plough and a gun in one 
hand. 
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promote the settling, working and defending of the Land of Israel (Kellerman and 
Azaryahu 1998). 
In summary, the symbolic meaning of the Tel-Hai national myth, which emphasized 
personal sacrifice and agricultural work, was closely associated with issues of 
security. As one Jewish farmer in the Negev noted, during the days I work outside, 
tending to the livestock. At night I sleep in a small room which I built inside the den, 
keeping my rifle close to me so I could guard against theft (Barshovski 2007). 
Currently, the farmer is under arrest for man slaughter after shooting an Arab-
Bedouin who earlier this year (2007) trespassed the farm (Ibid). Although settlements 
in the peripheries were considered by the public as a continuation of the Tel-Hai 
tradition, settlers were not supposed to actively fight (Kellerman 1996). Instead, 
agricultural activity was extended to the boarder, fusing agriculture and security. 
As Kretzmer notes, security of the state is synonymous with security of the Jewish 
collective and that is often seen as promoting Jewish national goals (Quoted in 
Rouhana 1997:58). Accordingly, policies that are perceived as beneficial to non-Jews 
in Israel may also be perceived as not serving the national interest, or even as 
threatening national security. If Israel was defined as the state of all its citizens, 
positive development of Arab-Bedouin social equity might have been perceived as 
beneficial for the general national interest (Rouhana 1997:58). As it is, national 
identity in Israel is used to legitimize the states spatial policies and demographic 
control in the Negev. Hence, the construction of citizenship and nationality in Israel 
deserve some more attention. 
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5. Demos or Ethnos? Nationality and Citizenship 
in Israel 
In February 1995, Kaadan, an Israeli Arab citizen petitioned to the Israeli High Court 
against being discriminated by the Israeli Land Administration; in his appeal to the 
court, Kaadan claimed that he was refused to lease land from the ILA since he was 
not an ethnic Jew. Twelve years earlier, Kaadan had tried to move his family out of 
the run-down overcrowded Arab town Baqa into a small Jewish village built on 
Israeli state land in order to improve his familys standard of living. In 2000, the 
President of the High Court, Mr. Aharon Barak, ruled that the ILA had acted illegally 
by refusing to lease land to Kaadan. The Jura Kaadan won. However, up to this 
date he still has not been able to purchase the land. 
Mr. Aharon Barak, known as a champion of civil rights, noted this case (known as the 
Kaadan case) to be the most strenuous of his legal career (Ash 2004). The fact that 
the President of the High Court found it difficult to protect the civil right of an Arab 
citizen for having an equal access to state land is a living testimony of the problematic 
nature of the relations between the state and its Arab ethnic minorities as well as to 
the challenges of civil rights in the Jewish state. In order to understand how the 
construction of Israeli national identity causes the marginalization of the Arab-
Bedouin community, this chapter untangles the construction of nationality and 
citizenship in Israel. 
Before delving into the issue of Israeli national identity, it should be noted that the 
relationship between the state and the Arab-Bedouins is distinct from issues related to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Firstly, Israeli Arab citizens do not have interaction 
with the Palestinian people and its leadership, as their social, economic and political 
daily lives is restricted to Israel proper. Secondly, Israeli Arab citizens collective 
experience is different from the experience of the Palestinians under Israeli 
occupation or under the Palestinian authority in the West Bank and Gaza. Thirdly, 
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they are not represented by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) or the 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the Palestinian polity (Rouhana 1997). 
The issues of national identity and citizenship are linked to the concept of democracy. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary democracy is defined as a form of 
government in which the people have a voice in the exercise of power. The word 
democracy was coined in ancient Greece, originating from the Greek words demos 
(people) and kratia (rule) literally meaning the rule of the people (Oxford 2007). 
Joseph Schumpeter explains democracy as a system for arriving at political decisions 
in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle 
for the peoples vote (Banik 2006a:57). Democracy is often regarded as requiring a 
minimum of conditions including a) liberty and equality among the members of the 
demos, b) a territory, c) elected governmental bodies and d) regulated competition 
between political parties (Rouhana 1997:35; Yiftachel 2000:732). 
The three most common types of democratic political regimes are liberal, republican 
and ethnic democracies. These models are distinct from each other vis a vis  
government accountability, fair elections, civil rights and associational autonomy 
(Potter 2000:365). In countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and 
France, the liberal model of democracy means that all individuals have equal rights, 
such as the right to freedom of expression and freedom of religion13 (Wollf 2004:6). 
In addition, citizens in liberal democracies have the right to form political parties and 
interest groups (Potter 2000:367). In liberal democracies, the elected representatives 
are usually moderated by a constitution that protects the rights of individuals. In 
addition, constraints are placed against the will of the majority in order to protect the 
rights of the minorities. Republican democracy is a system that replaces inherent rule 
with citizenship, for example in countries such as Canada, Switzerland, Belgium and 
                                            
13 Although liberal democracy tries to be neutral it is not unbiased. For example, a Muslim women in 
France asked to remove her headscarf while in school might consider the state regulation to be an act 
of cultural imperialism. 
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Malaysia, where collective identities are recognized by the state. In this model the 
collective rights of one group can lead to anothers marginalization (Wollf 2004:7). 
The third model of democracy is an ethnic democracy. The latter is a specific 
expression of nationalism that exists in contested territories where a dominant ethnos 
gains political control and uses the state apparatuses to ethnicize the territory and 
society in question (Yiftachel 2000:730). The word ethnos corresponds with the 
Latin word natio translated into birth (Oxford 2007). The ethno, which is a 
competing concept of the demos, is defined as a historically formed community of 
people characterized by common, relatively stable cultural features, certain distinctive 
cultural traits, and the consciousness of their unity as distinguished from other similar 
communities (Allen and Eade 2000:495). 
Nationalism in ethnic democracies, or ethnocraties fuses three forces: (a) internal 
colonization of space through settling activity, (b) separating nationality and 
citizenship and (c) creating ethno-classes stratification by using development to 
marginalize group foreign to the hegemonic ethnic group (Yiftachel 2000:730). 
Accordingly, it is membership in the ethnos that enables participation in the public 
life and grants access to the common good. National movements within ethnocraties 
often move to exclude rather than merge parts of society, practiced in countries such 
as Japan, Estonia, Sri Lanka and in Second World War Germany (Yiftachel 
2002:220). For example, in Japan, the Burakumin people have been historically 
excluded by the dominant ethnic group (Wollf 2004:9). In Estonia, all people with 
Estonian descent are regarded as citizens, while most Russians, even after two 
generations of living in the country, are not entitled to citizenship. In Sri Lanka, over 
two million Tamils having resided in the country for generations are denied 
citizenship since they are marked as ethnically different from the Sinhalese ethnos 
(Yiftachel 2000:731). In Nazi Germany, the myth of common origin corresponded 
with state structures. Adolph Hitler could therefore claim that the state is the living 
organism of the nation and most Germans could understand what he meant, although 
they might have disagreed with him (Allen and Eade 2000:488). 
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According to Fredrik Barth and Anthony Smith, ethnicity is understood as an aspect 
of social relations linked to the maintenance of real and imagined boundaries. An 
ethnic community is defined by Smith as a named human population with a myth of 
common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of 
culture, including an association with a homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at 
least among the elites (Smith 1986:13). Going back to the debate between 
primordialists and modernists regarding the nature of nations and ethnicity, it is 
useful to remember that Smith agrees with the modernist approach, which does not 
accept the primordialism of nations. However, unlike the modernists who find the 
distant past to be irrelevant for understanding nationalism, Smith contends that there 
is a need to inquire into the genealogy of nations. He argues that  () any study of 
the roots of nations must study the culture of that nation (Smith 1986:7) and that 
the ancient past explains the national present (Smith 1983:10). 
According to modernist thinkers such as Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm, ethnicity 
is not a real phenomenon existing independently of human concepts. Instead, they 
argue that ethnicity is an invented idea, invoked by social elites to accomplish 
political agendas. Considering this issue from a pragmatic position, whether ethnicity 
is natural or not, is irrelevant. Although ethnicity may be socially constructed, it   
has tangible effects e.g., legitimizing a certain development policy. Accordingly, a 
critical examination of the mechanisms used by the hegemony to legitimize the 
marginalization of other groups requires an analysis of the cultural foundations of a 
given nation. In doing so, one should take into account the obvious paradox that 
although ethnicity is not real it does have actual consequences, functioning like a 
placebo. In line with the approach offered by Barth and Smith, the rest of this chapter 
focuses on the way ethnic boundaries and national identity are constructed and 
maintained in Israel. 
 72
5.1 The Dynamics of Ethnic Policies in Israel; Jewish and 
Democratic? 
-Who are you? 
-I am an Israeli. 
-No, what nationality? 
-I am an Israeli. 
-But also the Arab is an Israeli. 
-I am an Israeli in my identity, not just in my citizenship. 
-But are you a Jew? 
-Of course, I just told you that I am an Israeli. 
(Rouhana 1997:230). 
Israel is a country where even simple issues often have the tendency of becoming 
complicated. Undoubtedly, part of the reason for this is the inherent difficulties of 
terminology and the many senses in which conceptual categories such as 
nationality, citizenship and religion are used. Indeed, Israel is distinctive with 
relation to a variety of issues, e.g., the mixture of individual and collective rights, the 
role of religion in policy and most importantly, the lack of conformity between 
citizenship and nationality (Wollf 2004:3). The nature of the Israeli state is linked to 
its socio-historical context of being formed as a society of settlers/immigrants. 
Currently, the country is still absorbing immigrants and is engaged in settlement 
activity both within and outside its international borders (Kimmerling 1999). The 
literature regarding the Israeli political system is vast. During the last decades 
scholars like Amnon Rubinshtein (1967), Baruch Kimmerling (1999), Ben Wolff 
(2004), Ishak Saporta &Yosi Yonah (2002), Nadim Rouhana (1997), Oren Yiftachel, 
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(2000), Sami Smooha and Yoav Peled (1992) have been engaged in describing the 
Israeli polity, struggling to label its democratic characteristics. The scholarly debate 
of the nature of the Israeli democracy is marked with contradictions, either describing 
Israel as a shameful apartheid state or as a full liberal democracy; either as the 
exclusive state of the Jewish people or as the state of all its citizens (Glaser 2003). 
Although the question whether Israel is a democracy or not is interesting, the aim of 
this chapter is not to solve this analytical debate. Keeping in mind that the concept of 
democracy is distinct from theories of democracy (Banik 2006a:58), meaning, the 
definition of democracy is separated from the question whether democracy is good, 
this chapter focuses on the challenges that the construction of Israeli democracy, 
nationality and citizenship pose to the wellbeing of the Arab-Bedouin citizens of the 
state. 
Most Israeli and Western scholars regard Israel as a democracy. Democracy enjoys a 
wide consensus in Israel in the sense that it is taken for granted as well known and 
requiring no proof (Rouhana 1997:35). For example, the Basic Law on human 
dignity and freedom passed in 1992, states that the purpose of this law is to protect 
human dignity and freedom, in order to lay down the ethical value of the state of 
Israel, as a Jewish and democratic state 14 (Rouhana 1997:35, emphasis is mine). 
In contemporary Western countries, it is citizenship rather than ethnicity or religion 
that indicates belonging to the demos (Don-Yehiya 1998:273). This means that the 
state does not identify itself with any ethnic or religion groups of citizens. In Israel, 
however, the state is committed to the Jewish people, despite the fact that parts of its 
citizens are not Jewish. Noam Chomsky explains the tension between the 
Jewishness of the state and its commitment to liberal democratic values: 
 The Zionist dream is to construct a state which is as Jewish as England is 
 English and France is French. At the same time, this state is to be a democracy 
                                            
14 In Israel, which does not have a constitution, the various Basic Laws are the foundations of a future 
constitution. 
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 on the Western model. Evidently, these goals are incompatible. Citizens of 
 France are French, but citizens of the Jewish state may be non-Jews (). To 
 the extent that Israel is a Jewish state it can not be a democratic state (Quoted 
 in Adalah 2001:8). 
Yoav Peled argues that the Israeli political system is defined by two types of 
citizenship: republican for the Jews and liberal for the Arabs (Peled 1992:432). This 
means that while the Arabs formally enjoy civil rights as individuals, the Jews enjoy 
communal rights in addition to the individual rights recognized to the Arabs. But what 
Peled obviously forgets is that in a republic democracy it is the minoritys group 
rights that are secured against the tyranny of the majority and not the group rights of 
the majority. 
Contrary to Peled, scholars such as Yiftachel (1998) and Rouhana (1997) describe 
Israel as an ethnocracy, where citizenship laws are based on the principle of jus 
sanguinis (blood relations) and not jus soli (territory) and where ethnic identity is 
the primary factor in granting citizenship status (and certain civil rights). The most 
telling example of Israels commitment towards the Jewish citizens of the state is The 
Law of Return, which was enacted in 1950, granting any Jew the right to settle in 
Israel, acquiring full citizenship automatically upon arrival (Rubinstein 1967:435). 
While this right is granted to Jews, the Law of Shielding the Deprivation of the Right 
of Return, passed by the Knesset in 2001, denies the Palestinians the right to return to 
Israel (Adalah 2001:11). It should, however, be remembered that at the time when the 
Law of Return was enacted, many of the Jews arriving in Israel where either refugees 
of the Holocaust or immigrants from Muslim countries where Jews faced racial 
intolerance (Yiftachel 2002:228). 
In the Israeli Declaration of Independence, signed by the State Council on 14th of May 
1948, it was announced that the Land of Israel, 
was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and 
political identity was shaped. Here they first attained statehood, created 
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cultural values of national and universal significance and gave the Bible to the 
world () by virtue of our natural and historic right we hereby declare the 
establishment of a Jewish state in the Land of Israel (Israels Declaration of 
Independence 1948, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
Indeed, following the war of 1948 Israel was founded not only as a Jewish state but 
as the state of the Jews, regardless where they held their citizenship (Gover 1992). In 
1992, the Knesset (Israeli parliament) ratified two basic laws declaring the state of 
Israel to be both Jewish and democratic. Similarly, the World Zionist Organization 
and Jewish Agency Law proclaimed that the state of Israel regards itself as the 
creation of the entire Jewish people, and its gates are open, in accordance with its 
laws, to every Jew wishing to immigrate to it (Rouhana 1997:32). Manifesting the 
above proclamation, Edward Said noted that, Israel is now not only the only state in 
the world that is not the state of its citizens but of the whole Jewish people wherever 
they may be (Rosen-Zvi 2002:3). Israels strong commitment to the Jewish people is 
expressed in various laws, rules, regulations and practices. The following examples 
suffice in illustrating the exclusive Jewish identity of the Israeli state. 
In 1985, the state adopted the amendment to the Basic Law, denying any party whose 
actions or beliefs negate the existence of the state of Israel as the state of the Jews the 
right to participate in the elections to the government (Peled 1992:438). As a 
consequence, participation in government elections by a party that wishes to 
challenge the Jewish nature of the state could be denied, even if it wishes to do so 
through a parliamentary process (Rouhana 1997). 
The Flag and the Emblem Law enacted in 1949, reflects the governments decision 
that the flag and emblem of Israel should be a combination of Zionist and Jewish 
religious imagery (Adalah 2001). The Israeli flag is also the flag of the Zionist 
movement and is demonstrating two Jewish historic and religious symbols- the Talit 
(praying shawl), represented by two horizontal blue strips and magen david (the 
Shield of David), a Jewish symbol several hundred years old (Gal 2007:226). 
Moreover, the menorah (the seven branched candelabrum) had served for centuries as 
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a Jewish symbol in synagogues and eventually was adopted as the symbol of the state 
of Israel (Gal 2007:226). 
The public holidays in Israel are all Jewish-centred. The Israeli Independence Day, 
for instance, celebrates the victory of the Israeli Defence Force over the neighbouring 
Arab countries but also symbolizes for the Arab citizens the defeat of the Palestinian 
National Movement as well as the fragmentation of Palestine and the Palestinian 
people (Rouhana 1997:33). The text of the national hymn hatikva (Hope) is highly 
particularistic and has no meaning for the non-Jewish citizens of the state (Adalah 
2001:47). As one Arab-Bedouin man noted, the melody of the national hymn is nice, 
but I am unable to identify myself with its lyrics (02.12.06, Interview in Rahat). 
hatikva, which expresses the yearning of the Jewish people for Zion, is also the hymn 
of the Zionist movement: 
 As long as in the heart, within, 
 a Jewish soul still yearns, 
 and towards the end of the East 
 an eye still watches toward Zion 
 Our hope is not yet lost, 
 the hope of two thousand years, 
 to be a free nation in our own land, 
 the land of Zion- Jerusalem 
(Naftali Herz Imber 1878, translation from Hebrew). 
As discussed earlier, Jewish national and personal redemption is linked to the ethos of 
geulat karka (land redemption). As those from whom the land is to be redeemed, 
the Arabs can not participate in this process (Peled 1992:435). As an Arab-Bedouin 
man noted: 
 I can not transform myself, even for a moment, into a pioneer, a settler  or a 
 Zionist (). Equality should not be claimed on the grounds that I am a 
 Zionist but on the grounds that I am also a human being, or at least on the 
 ground that I am also a citizen or resident of the state (Quoted in Saporta and 
 Yonah 2002:103). 
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In the Jewish state, Arab citizens are usually exempted from military service. 
Mandatory for most Jews but denied to Israeli Arabs, the military service functions as 
a gate-keeper causing socio-economic segregation between the Arabs and the Jews 
(Peled 1992:436). This exemption is not grounded in any law, but is still widely 
practiced, with the exception of Arab-Druze and Arab-Bedouins who are normally 
allowed military service. Since many social and economic benefits are linked to the 
military service, the Arab citizens ability to attend the common good is restricted, 
e.g. access to special low interest loans, partial exemptions from fees in state-run 
courses, preferences in public employment, educational loans and on campus housing 
(Adalah 2001; Wollf 2004). 
In 1948, Israel declared a state of emergency, which is still maintained today. 
Israels permanent state of emergency enables it to re-enforce regulations that the 
British Mandate used against the Palestinians and the Jews in Palestine previous to 
194815 (Rouhana 1997:58). 
Another example of the unequal distribution of civil rights can be found in the 
development and allocation of land resources by the Jewish National Fund. The JNF 
was founded in 1901, in order to pursue the project of nation building in the Land of 
Israel (Bishara et al. 2006). After Israel reached statehood, it transferred about two 
million dunams of land to the JNF so that the land could be developed to benefit the 
Jews (Rouhana 1997). In 1952, the state enacted the World Zionist Organization-
Jewish Agency in Israel Law, granting several Zionist organizations, among them the 
JNF, the right to act in Israel as semi-governmental agencies. As a result, more than 
20 percent of the land in Israel is owned by the JNF. 
According to the JNFs official statements, its objectives are purchasing, acquiring 
by lease or exchange, receiving by leas or any other way, lands, forests () for the 
                                            
15 The League of Nations mandate was used to govern areas of colonial rule in the Middle East, 
where parts of the Ottoman Empire were divided between Britain and France (Bernstein 2000). The 
term British Mandate refers to Palestine between the years 1920-1948, a time period in which the 
British Empire governed the area (Rozen-Zvi 2002). 
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purpose of settling Jews on the said lands () (Adalah 2001:32, emphasised in the 
original text). This means that the JNF is committed to develop the land only for the 
benefit of the Jewish people, insisting that its devotion is not given to the general 
public in Israel, but to the Jewish ethnos alone (Bishara and Hamdan 2006). For 
instance, while hundreds of settlements were built for the use of Jewish citizens, not 
one rural settlement was built for the Arab population. In addition, according to JNFs 
policy, land is not to be sold to non-Jews (Rouhana 1997:53). The nationalist aspects 
of the JNF, which originated from the Zionist interpretation of the biblical text, the 
land shall not be sold forever for the land is Mine (Leviticus 15:23), prevent Arab-
Bedouins access to approximately 20 percent of the countrys land (Rouhana 1997). 
Ironically, the state of Israel is defined under the principals of freedom, justice and 
peace as envisaged by the Prophets of Israel; [and] it will ensure complete equality of 
social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race, or sex 
() (Israels Declaration of Independence 1948, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
However, the definition of Israel as a Jewish state recognizes only one people, one 
history and one national memory. It excludes the Arab citizens by generating 
oppressive policies against them. In defining itself as the state of the Jewish people, 
Israel denied itself developing an inclusive Israeli national identity that encompasses 
all citizens. In fact, there is no Israeli nationality; it is either Jewish or Arab 
(Rouhana 1997). Consequently, this reality construes sentiments of frustration and 
isolation among the Israeli-Arab minorities (Adalah 2001), that is best expressed in 
the poem Identity Card, by Mahmoud Darwish: 
 Write down! 
 I am an Arab 
 and my identity card number is fifty thousand 
 I have eight children 
 and the ninth will come after the summer 
 will you be angry? 
 Write down! 
 I am an Arab 
 employed with fellow workers at a quarry 
 I have eight children 
 I get them bread 
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 garments and books 
 from the rocks 
 I do not supplicate charity at your doors 
 nor do I belittle myself at the footsteps of your chamber 
 so will you be angry? 
 
 Write down! 
 I am an Arab 
 I have a name without a title 
 patient in a country 
 where people are enraged 
 my roots 
 were entrenched before the birth of time 
 and before the opening of the eras 
 before the pines, and the olive trees 
 and before the grass grew 
 
 My father descends from the family of the plough 
 not from a privileged class 
 and my grandfatherwas a farmer 
 neither well-bred, nor well-born! 
 taught me the pride of the sun 
 before teaching me how to read 
 and my house is like a watchman's hut 
 made of branches and cane 
 are you satisfied with my status? 
 I have a name without a title! 
 
 Write down! 
 I am an Arab 
 you have stolen the orchards of my ancestors 
 and the land which I cultivated 
 along with my children 
 and you left nothing for us 
 except for these rocks 
 so will the State take them 
 as it has been said?! 
 
 Therefore! 
 write down on the top of the first page: 
 I do not hate people 
 nor do I encroach 
 but if I become hungry 




 of my hunger 
 and my anger!  
(Mahmoud Darwish 1964). 
Israels official definition as a Jewish state is clearly more than semantics. Access to 
the common good and distribution of civil and human rights are granted in 
accordance with ethnic belonging rather than citizenship (Kimmerling 1999:340). The 
ethnically prejudiced distribution of resources is revealed through the 
interconnectedness of land allocation and belonging to the Jewish ethnos. It is 
generally accepted that in ethnocraties, or countries governed by unstable 
democracies, disparities in the distribution of wealth demonstrate human rights 
abuses, in the form of state sanctions towards a section of its citizens (Niezen 
2003:56). The situation where peoples access to resources is denied based on ethnic 
reasons, is discriminatory and contradicts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
Article 1, where it is stated that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights () (UNGA 1948:1). The UN International Covenants on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 articulate the 
rights of peoples to control resources, self determination, practice of subsistence and 
cultural development (ICESCR 1966). As mentioned earlier, both the Israeli Land 
Administration, e.g. the Kaadan case and the Jewish National Fund violate these 
rights, through practicing an unequal development and distribution of land resources, 
in addition to denying the Arabs citizens the right to equal opportunities. 
5.1.1 Summary 
 Are we eventually going to set up a theocracy? No! Belief holds us together, 
 science makes us free. We are not going to allow our rabbis even to think 
 about theocratic ideas. We are going to know how to restrict them to their 
 synagogues just as we are going to retain our army within their bases () and 
 should people of other creed or other nationality come to live among us we are 
 going to guarantee them honourable protection and equal rights. We have 
 81
 learned tolerance in Europe (Dr. Herzl, a Viennese Jewish Journalist and  the 
 founder of the Zionist movement, in his pamphlet "Der Judenstaat" from 1896, 
 quoted in Rubinstein 1967:108). 
A common practice among members of social groups, inside and outside of Israel, is 
to base their sense of collective identities on the perceptions of the difference 
between us and them (Merom 1999). For instance, in the seventeenth century the 
British elite regarded itself to be exceptionally rational and scientific compared to 
other nations (Greenfeld 1992). According to Greenfeld, national identity was in 
effect identical with citizenship and since a nation existed only insofar as its 
members kept the social compact, could be in principle acquired or abandoned of 
ones free will (Ibid). This however, is not the case in Israel of 2007, as membership 
in the nation and national identity are separated from the concept of citizenship. 
If democracy stands for equal membership in the demos, and equal membership in the 
demos is realized through civil and human rights equally distributed in all parts of 
society, then it follows that the manner by which Israel defines itself poses a threat to 
liberal values. A liberal democracy that emphasizes an inclusive and civil national 
identity, can secure a more equal distribution of resources. It lifts a barrier against 
social exclusion of ethnic minorities, allowing full access to the common good on the 
basis of citizenship, not on the basis of being a member of a certain ethnic group 
(Saporta and Yonah 2002). 
The human world is not just a cultural assemblage but it is also a political stage, 
where large segments of the human population owe their allegiance not just to the 
state but also to an indigenous nation. The latter is often subjected to tight spatial 
control for no other reason than for occupying the same space simultaneously with 
another nation. As we observed, there is an inherent duality in the way Israel 
recognizes civil rights to its citizens, granting some rights on the basis of ethnic 
belonging, while simultaneously providing a democratic framework based on liberal 
individualism. Interestingly, this duality is also inherent to the Zionist movement. 
Zionism grew as a secular and emancipatory movement which was influenced by 
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European liberalism (Kimmerling 1983). While it presented itself as an anti-colonial 
liberation movement, it evolved as a colonial project, attempting to maximize 
landholding in Israel/Palestine, advancing the undemocratic project of Judaizing the 
country16 (Yiftachel 2000:736; Yiftachel 2002:226). 
The reason why Israels status as a democracy is such a contested concept is that the 
association of ethnicity with national identity has become ingrained into the Jewish 
nature of the state (Kimmerling 1999). The state symbolic system is strictly Jewish: 
Israel calendar, days and sites of commemoration, heroes, flag, emblem, national 
anthem, names of places and ceremonies are all Jewish. Since Israels character as 
Jewish is defined in exclusive ethno-religious terms, Jewish ownership of the state 
defeats equal citizenship as the states raison detre (Wollf 2004). Consequently, by 
devoting itself to benefit Jews rather than its citizens the state creates a gap between 
nationality/ethnicity and citizenship (Meir and Zivan 1998; Rosen-Zvi 2002). The 
identity card carried by every adult in Israel includes the rubric: nationality. Under 
this rubric the word Jew appears for Israeli Jews and the word Arab appears for 
the Arab citizens (Rouhana 1997:220). Thus, erecting an imaginary as well as a real 
boundary between the concepts of nationality and citizenship, re-formulating 
Jewishness not just as a religion but also as a nationality. Defining the state as 
Jewish enables the state to create separated Jewish and Arab ethnoscapes based on 
notions of ethnicity and nationality (Bishara and Hamdan 2006). For example, as 
discussed above, non-Jews are unable to lease or buy land from the Jewish National 
Fund, whose policy of land allocation is based on ethnical attachments. 
In conclusion, the construction of the states identity as inherently Jewish disallows 
equal membership in Israeli society to citizens not belonging to the Jewish hegemonic 
ethnos. From the perspective of the Arab citizens, the notion that Israel is the state of 
the Jews regardless of their citizenship, but not necessarily the state of its Arab 
                                            
16 The Zionist movement presented itself as anti-colonial, attempting to liberate the homeland from 
the British (Yiftachel 2002). 
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citizens demeans their status and isolates them both psychologically, emotionally, 
socially and economically. Israel grants its Arab citizens some equality in access to 
resources as a show of generosity, a kind of noblesse oblige (Rouhana 1997). But 
some equality actually means no equality. To put in the words of an Arab-Bedouin 
man from the town of Rahat: my dream is that my children and grandchildren, Arab 
citizens of Israel, could feel that they belong to the state as part of the society, with 
full rights, without feeling like a fifth weal and without feeling like they are the 
enemy () (Edler 2006). 
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6. Conclusions 
The consequence of an Israeli national identity being formulated according to ethnic 
boundaries and strictly defined within the paradigm of a Jewish ethnos, is that non-
Jewish minorities are perceived by the Jewish majority as potential enemies (Merom 
1999; Rouhana 1997). This perception has enabled the state to attribute the inequality 
and discrimination of the Arabs to security issues and to legitimize unequal 
distribution of resources and civil rights, e.g. through land policies and land 
management (Rouhana 1997). The result, one may argue, is that after 59 years of 
distributive injustice, Israeli society is stratified along the lines of ethnicity, having 
created ethno-classes. Since national identity and territorial demarcation were crucial 
for the Zionist project in terms of nation building, ethnic boundaries were laden with 
images of spatial representation, creating ethnically segregated spaces of Jews and 
Arabs and in the process depriving Arab-Bedouins and other ethnic minorities of their 
land. 
The Zionist ethos is still potent in Israels political culture. Any attempt by non-Jews 
to protest against the exclusive nature of the Jewish state is perceived by the state as a 
demonstration of disloyalty and consequently, as a threat to national security. As 
mentioned earlier, these notions are used to legitimize discriminatory policies. In the 
Zionist project of territorializing Jewish national identity, myths and narratives of 
frontier settlement, e.g. the myth of Tel-Hai and the redemption of the land, were 
associated with security issues, further contributing to the legitimization of spatial 
policies of land allocation. As we have seen, these spatial policies include 
mechanisms such as the establishment of isolated farms, land acquisition, the 
appropriation of Arab-Bedouin land and policies of demographic control. 
During the Zionist settlement project, which gave rise to development schemes such 
as the Sharon Plan and the Wine Road Project, Arab-Bedouin private and collective 
assets were split, annexed and eroded, resulting in unsustainable life conditions. As 
discussed in the first chapter, a successful implementation of sustainable development 
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must be based on three chief pillars: environmental reliability, economic vitality and 
social equity (Brundtland 1987). The case of the Arab-Bedouins in the Negev clearly 
demonstrates that failing to attend to all three aspects of the sustainable development 
paradigm, can only result in a humanitarian and environmental crisis. The Arab-
Bedouins currently living in the townships may have a higher income than 50 yeas 
ago when they lived in tents, and perhaps today more Arab-Bedouins are officially 
employed than before. However, economic growth alone cannot secure human 
flourishing. In fact, a sustainable increase in welfare can be achieved without 
economic growth, as the case of Kerala clearly shows17 (Banik 2006a:100). Similarly, 
taking the environment into consideration on the one hand, but neglecting the social 
factor on the other, is not truly sustainable. This is why adding a few green spots on 
the map under the salient ethos of making the desert bloom cannot be sustainable, 
as long as transparency, inclusiveness and equality in the distribution of natural and 
social resources among all citizens of the state is satisfied. 
During previous discussions it has been clarified that the rise of nationalism in 
modern times, although very often had its roots in ancient times, is understood to be a 
mechanism used by the social elites to fuse state and nation, creating modern nation-
states, e.g., France and Germany. Indeed, the Zionist national revival movement, 
seeking to build a home for the Jewish people in the Land of Israel, utilized popular 
traditions, symbols and myths to form the national collective out of the many 
culturally distinct Jewish communities in the Diaspora. For example, the tradition of 
celebrating pesah was utilized to revalidate the socialist agenda of the kibbutzim. 
However, the Zionist movement did not follow the European pattern of bridging the 
gap between the nation and the state. Instead, similar to states such as Serbia, 
Northern Ireland, Cyprus and Malaysia, it created an ethnic democracy, or an 
ethnocracy, where the state identifies itself with a specific ethnic segment of its 
                                            
17 The Kerala case shows that low level economies are able to significantly improve human social 
equity. In Kerala, an increase in life expectancy, a decrease in child mortality, 100 percent literacy and 
sustainable population reduction were achieved without a significant increase in income. 
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citizens, keeping the tension between ethno-national belonging and formal 
citizenship, allowing the marginalization of non-ethnics. 
In a sense, states have always been at a disadvantage when it comes to earning the 
loyalty of their citizens (Niezen 2003). In Israel, the situation where the state imposes 
social, legal, symbolic and spatial boundaries between the majority Jewish ethnos, 
and other non-Jewish ethnic minorities, can be seen as a counterproductive policy, as 
it alienates a group of citizens from identifying with the state, risking that in the 
course of seeking national identity this group will pursue self-determination 
(Yiftachel 1996). In other words, where spatial control and other means of 
domination are used by the state to economically and socially exclude minority 
groups, the latter will often seek to break away from the state, consequently, 
threatening the states territorial domination (Newman 2001). 
Indeed, if Israel sticks to its present policy as an ethnic democracy, maintaining a 
status quo of inequality between ethno-classes, the Arab-Bedouins and other ethnic 
minorities might decide to resort to international organizations, to get their rights 
recognized (See for example, The Arab Bedouins of the Naqeb-Negev Desert in 
Israel, Shadow Report, a report submitted to the UN Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD), submitted by the Negev Coexistence Forum in 
2006; NCF 2006a). Therefore, in order to counter any separationist tendencies of 
minority groups, if not for other reasons such as securing distributive justice and 
human dignity, Israel should promote group cohesion by drafting a constitution that 
guarantees the recognition of rights on the basis of civil citizenship. 
6.1 Natonalism, Nationality and Citizenship, Final 
Comments 
 -Excuse me for prying, but Id like to ask you, are you Jewish or Arab? 
 -I am an Arab-Jew. 
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 -You are funny. 
 -No, I am quite serious. 
 -Arab-Jew? I have never heard of that. 
 -It is quite simple: just the way you say you are an American Jew. Here, try to 
 say European Jews. 
 -European Jews. 
 -Now, say Arab-Jews. 
 -You cant compare, European Jews is something else. 
 -How come? 
 -Because Jew just doesnt go with Arab. It just doesnt go. It doesnt 
 even sound right. 
 -It depends on your ear. 
 -Look, I have nothing against the Arabs. I even have friends who are Arabs, 
 but how can you say an Arab Jew when all the Arabs want is to destroy the 
 Jews? 
 -And how can you say European Jews when the Europeans have already 
 destroyed the Jews? 
(Quoted in Ducker 2006:1). 
In recent years, the processes of globalization have ostensibly brought with them the 
end of nationalism. According to this view, traditional forms of boundaries become 
less meaningful, as information, finances and migrant workers cross the boundaries 
that no longer acts as a barrier (Newman 2001). The increasing flow of technologies, 
information, services, goods and people across state boundaries is often thought of as 
eroding the importance of old national sentiments. This period, in which these 
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processes are occurring, is described as the age of global systems and post 
governmental structures, portrayed by Habermas as the age of post-national 
identity (Ben-Ami 2000). As the world moves towards becoming a global village, 
notions of the diminishing role of nationalism are expressed. Consider for example 
the words of Eric Hobsbawm: nations and nationalism will be present in this history, 
but in subordinate, and often rather minor roles (Quoted in Smith 2003:1). To be 
sure, uncertainty about the future of nation-states and expectations of their decline are 
as old as nation-states themselves (Niezen 2003:197). These notions, however, are 
only one side of the bigger picture, as they neglect to attach weight to recent 
processes of re-territorialization and spatial re-configurations, brought by the revival 
of neo-nationalist movements, in places like Ayodhya, Kosovo and Jerusalem. In 
Spain, for example, properties of territory and the role of ancestral homelands have 
been re-invoked by Basque nationalists (Ben-Ami 2000; Smith 1999). Indeed, in this 
borderless world, where forty new state boundaries had been created since 1989, 
the control over a specific stretch of land remains closely related to notions of 
national identity (Newman 2001). 
In Israel, both post-nationalist and neo-nationalist ideas have been on the rise (Wollf 
2004). Israeli neo-nationalist ideology, i.e., neo-Zionism, is being reinforced by 
religious affiliations to places of worship, invoked in rhetorics of divine promises and 
sacred territories (Smith 2003). By contrast, post-nationalist ideas, i.e., post-Zionism, 
advocate the waning of Zionism as the primal factor of national identity, refocusing 
the debate around the idea of the civil state, where the state is committed to the 
interests of all its citizens (Rouhana 1997; Schnell 2004). 
Neo-Zionist ideas relate to the ancient Israelites who settled the Promised Land, the 
sites of battle, the resting place of the Arc of the Covenant, the place of the Temple, 
the sites of miracles and the tombs of rabbis (Smith 1999:152). Through embedding 
these places with sacred meanings, the neo-Zionists are defining the extent of their 
claims over territory. For the neo-Zionists, manifested by settlers in the West Bank 
and the Occupied Territories, territory remains the main tenet of their culturally 
constructed national and ethnic identities (Ben-Ami 2000). According to the settlers 
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of yehuda ve shomron (Judea and Samaria), living in the heart of the ancient 
Hebrew kingdom is supposed to hasten the appearance of the Messiah (Schnell 2004). 
A telling example is an article that was published in the Israeli online newspaper Y-
Net on Mai 2007. The article reveals that the last burial place of Herod the Great (74 
BC  ca. 4 BC) was found in gush etzion (Block of the tree), a cluster of Israeli 
settlements in the northern Judea region of the West Bank. The article describes the 
archaeological discovery and notes that, finding the last burial place of Herod the 
Great, (), is another proof of the strong links of gush etzion to the history of the 
Jewish people and to Jerusalem (Translated from Hebrew, Shoval 2007). To be sure, 
by weaving notions of historical continuity into the meaning of the archaeological 
burial site, Jewish settlers are able to revalidate the claim that gush etzion is a Jewish 
territory where Jews have the right and the obligation to settle. It then follows that, if 
a territory is the promised land, than it must be owned. If a piece of land is 
redeemed by its historic true owners, liberated in some miraculous victory of few 
over many, it can not be negotiated. And if a certain community is defining itself as 
the chosen people, it follows according to the neo-Zionist logic, that other people 
are less worthy (Newman 2001). 
Post-Zionists on the other hand (represented by a small group of Israeli academics), 
seek to transform the Israeli ethnic state into a civil state, moving away from the 
ethnocratic model towards a liberal democracy (Schnell 2004). Unlike the political 
model of ethnic democracies where there is an official distinction between nationality 
and citizenship, e.g., Arab-Israeli, in the civil state, at least officially, nationality is 
similar to citizenship. This means that in order to shrink the gap between nationality 
and citizenship, national identity must be broadly defined to include all citizens of the 
state and be formed on the basis of geographical delineations. In other words, to 
transform Israel from an ethnic democracy into a liberal democracy, national identity 
must be defined according to territory, as in, say, France, and not according to ethnic 
relations, as in Sri Lanka or Greece (Rouhana 1997). 
In transforming Israel to the state of all its citizens, its exclusive Jewish nature has to 
be compromised in favour of a civil, secular national identity, with symbols such as 
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the national hymn, national emblem and the national flag transformed to 
accommodate the different ethnic groups. By defining itself as the state of the Jews, 
Israel failed to develop a national identity that represents the entire civil population, 
including Jews, Arab-Bedouins and other ethnic minorities. By creating an inclusive 
Israeli national identity, contested spaces may be reconfigured as shared places, no 
longer finding it necessary to practise spatial segregation and demographic control to 
support a sense of a national self. 
At this point, one may argue that symbolic landscapes and places should be 
demystified, redeemed from the various myths and national narratives embedded in 
them by those who had the interest to do so (Hasson and Gossenfeld 1980). As part of 
the process of creating a new Israeli national identity, the political and social 
meanings of sacred places and holy landscapes need to be re-opened for an honest 
public debate, reclaiming the meanings of these places back from the domain of 
Nature into the domain of history. Once the process of demystification has begun, 
history can be re-valued. For example, Zionist Kibbutzim may be viewed as  a social 
experiment set up by unemployed, seemingly confused persons, who had no 
connection whatsoever with the goals of national salvation and spiritual redemption 
(Hasson 1998). Only then could graves be seen as the last resting place of human 
beings and not as places of national significance; only then could battle sites be seen 
as a demonstration of the horror of wars, not as places celebrating the glorious 
sacrifice of peoples lives in the name of national destiny. 
It is therefore suggested that symbolic places of Zionist history be deconstructed and 
reconstructed, first, stripped of their old chauvinistic meanings, and then laden with 
new symbolic meanings that celebrate coexistence. Such a process will discharge the 
landscape of its current nationalistic dimensions, turning it back from an ethnoscape 
into a landscape, where citizens are able to live peacefully in spatial and symbolic 
coexistence. Following Shlomo Hasson (1998), I would like to conclude with a 
monologue between a man and a boy, standing on the shoreline of the Mediterranean 
Sea: 
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 -In What Language are you speaking, uncle? 
 -In Arabic. 
 -With whom? 
 -With the fish. 
 -Do the fish understand only Arabic? 
 -Yes, the old fish, the ones that where here when the Arabs were. 
 -And the young fish, do they understand Hebrew? 
 -They understand Hebrew, Arabic, and all Languages. The seas are wide and 
 flow together. They have no borders and have room enough for all fish. 
 -Wow. 




Aliya lakarka (Hebrew): Ascent to the land (of Israel). 
Ashkenazi (Hebrew): European Jew. 
Bedu (Arabic): Desert dweller. 
Beit avadim (Hebrew): House of slaves, refers to Biblical Egypt. 
Dirah (Arabic): An area over which a tribal group claims traditional ownership, or 
right of access. 
Dunam (Turkish): 1 dunam is 1000 square meters, or a quarter of an acre. 
Erets Israel (Hebrew): Land of Israel. 
Ge Ben Hinnom (Hebrew): Literally means valley of death. The name refers to a 
location in Jerusalem. 
Geulat karka (Hebrew): Land redemption. 
Gush etzion (Hebrew): Literally means block of the tree, a group of settlements in 
the northern Judea region of the West Bank. 
Hafrachat hashmama (Hebrew): Making the desert bloom. 
Haluts (Hebrew): A pioneer. 
Halutziut (Hebrew): Pioneering. 
Hatikva (Hebrew): Literally means hope, Israeli national hymn. 
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Hityashvut (Hebrew): The process of Jewish settlement. 
Jus sanguinis (Latin): Right of blood, a right by which nationality or citizenship can 
be recognized to any individual born to a parent who is a national or citizen of the 
state. 
Jus soli (Latin): Right of soil, a right by which nationality or citizenship can be 
recognized to any individual born in the territory of the related state. 
kibush hashmama (Hebrew): Conquest of the desert. 
Kibbutz (Hebrew): A settlement with collective organization of labour and housing, 
with equal sharing of production and consumption. 
Kol Israel Ahim (Hebrew): Literally means all Israel are brothers and sisters. 
Magen David  (Hebrew): The Shield of David. 
Mawat (Turkish): Unclaimed dead land. 
Menorah (Hebrew): the seven branched candelabrum used in the Temple in 
Jerusalem. 
Mirit (Turkish): State land. 
Mitspe (Hebrew): Communal settlements. 
Mizrahim (Hebrew): Jews from North African or Middle Eastern origin. 
Moshav, Moshava (Hebrew): Agricultural cooperative settlement based on the 
equality of its members to cultivate an equal share of land. 
Nachala (Hebrew): Jewish traditional demarcation of territory. 
Negev/Naqab (Hebrew/Arabic): Desert area in southern Israel. 
Pzura (Hebrew): Dispersion. refers to Arab-Bedouins unrecognized villages in the 
Negev. 
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Shavuot (Hebrew): Pentecost, a Jewish holiday, one of the three Biblical pilgrimage 
festivals. 
Sheikh (Arabic): Leader of clannish or religious order. 
Shmama (Hebrew): Literally means Wilderness. 
Siyag (Hebrew): An area in the Negev, into which most of the Arab-Bedouins of the 
Negev were moved during the 1950s. 
Sumud (Arabic): Steadfastness. 
Tanzimat Fermani (Turkish): Literally means reorganization, a period of 
reformation in the Ottoman Empire which began in 1839. 
Talit (Hebrew): Jewish praying shawl. 
Tabu (Turkish): Ottoman land tenure law, enacted in 1858. 
Terra nullius (Latin): No mans land, meaning empty land. 
Tu BiShvat (Hebrew): A Jewish holiday celebrating trees. 
Urf (Arabic): Islamic customary law. 
Vill (English): A tract of land of rural community. 
Yehuda ve shomron (Hebrew): Judea and Samaria. 
Watan (Arab): Arab traditional territory. 
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An Arab-Bedouin activist 
A member of the parents board in a school in Beer Hadaj- an 
Arab-Bedouin unrecognized village.  
Arab-Bedouins 4 
A local leader from Abde- an Arab-Bedouin unrecognized 
village 
Havarim farm 
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Jewish Farms 4 
Naama farm 
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